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N E S T O R  M .  D A V I D S O N  
Localist Administrative Law 
abstract . To read the voluminous literature on administrative law is to inhabit a world fo-
cused almost exclusively on federal agencies. This myopic view, however, ignores the wide array 
of administrative bodies that make and implement policy at the local-government level. The ad-
ministrative law that emerges from the vast subterranean regulatory state operating within cities, 
suburbs, towns, and counties has gone largely unexamined. 
 Not only are scholars ignoring a key area of governance, but courts have similarly failed to 
develop an administrative jurisprudence that recognizes what is distinctive about local agencies. 
The underlying justiﬁcations for core administrative law doctrines at the federal level, such as 
deference to agency expertise and respect for separation of powers, must be adapted for local 
contexts in which mayors can sit on city councils, agencies may operate with few clear procedural 
constraints, and ordinary citizens can play a direct role in determining policy. 
 To remedy these gaps in the literature and the doctrine, this Article makes three contribu-
tions. First, it offers a detailed descriptive account of local administration, outlining domains of 
local agency action, the governmental structures that deﬁne those agencies, and practical details 
of local agency operation. The Article then draws from this empirical grounding to identify par-
ticularly salient factors that can more transparently inform judicial review of a variety of local 
agency actions, from statutory interpretation to substantive policymaking to enforcement and 
licensing. These factors include the particular and varied nature of local-government structures, 
the tension between informality and procedural legitimacy within local administration, the mott-
led interplay of public and private spheres in local governance, and local agency expertise that 
reﬂects local knowledge. 
 This localist perspective, ﬁnally, has direct relevance to core scholarly debates in both local-
government law and administrative law. An understanding of local administration adds a layer of 
internal complexity to questions of local-government authority and identity, reorienting discus-
sions about democratic accountability and experimentalism. It likewise holds the promise of 
deepening administrative jurisprudence with a perspective that reaches across the entire range of 
our vertical federalism. In short, the world of local agencies opens a window for the study of an 
important, yet underappreciated, set of institutions. Calling attention to these agencies will ulti-
mately foster a new discourse about administrative law for local-government scholars and a 
broader understanding of governance for scholars of administrative law. 
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introduction 
In the waning days of Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration, the New 
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene promulgated a regulation 
that would have limited sales based on the portion size of so-called “sugary” 
drinks.
1
 This effort was the best-known—and arguably the most controver-
sial—of a long series of public-health rules from the agency that included 
smoking restrictions, a ban on trans fats, and a mandate for listing calorie 
counts in restaurants.
2
 Before the portion-limit regulation could take effect, 
however, the New York state courts invalidated it on grounds seemingly famil-
iar to any scholar of administrative law: separation of powers and the nondele-
gation doctrine.
3
 
What is distinctive about this controversy is not that the judiciary found 
that an administrative agency had overstepped its bounds; that much is rela-
tively banal, although not without its problems in this particular case.
4
 It is, ra-
ther, that the relevant agency promulgating the rule at issue was part of a local 
government. 
In legal scholarship, administrative law is almost always synonymous with 
federal administrative law.
5
 The institutional frameworks, doctrinal questions, 
and theoretical concerns that drive the voluminous literature on administrative 
law almost exclusively take the alphabet soup of federal executive-branch agen-
cies, acting pursuant to statutes enacted by Congress and overseen by Article 
III courts, as the reigning paradigm. The preoccupations and prescriptions of 
 
1. 24 RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. § 81.53 (2013), invalidated by N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 
2014); see also Pekham Pal, History, Governmental Structure, and Politics: Deﬁning the Scope of 
Local Board of Health Power, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 769, 790-96 (2015) (reviewing the por-
tion-cap litigation). 
2. See Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of Woodrow 
Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1864-65 (2013). The most recent chapter in this ongo-
ing public-health campaign has been a push to require menus to warn of particularly high-
salt foods. See William Neuman, New York City Can Enforce Salt Warnings on Menus, Court 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/nyregion/new 
-york-city-can-enforce-salt-warnings-on-menus-court-says.html [http://perma.cc/KQ9L 
-RPA2]. 
3. See Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 16 N.E.3d at 549. 
4. See infra Section IV.B.1. The fact that one ground of decision in the case was nondelegation 
does distinguish it from run-of-the-mill federal administrative law. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
5. See, e.g., William Funk, Beyond Casebooks, Beyond Treatises: Administrative Law Readers, 9 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 361, 364 (1995) (book review) (noting—and lamenting—that the three 
leading administrative law anthologies were “devoted exclusively to federal administrative 
law”). 
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mainstream administrative law accordingly ﬂow from this institutional and 
regulatory context.
6
 
This myopic federal focus obscures a massive, submerged, and surprisingly 
vibrant domain of administration that exists at the local-government level. 
Nested within the tens of thousands of cities, suburbs, towns, and counties 
that span the country is a vast panoply of local agencies with signiﬁcant front-
line regulatory responsibility. These agencies work in policy domains as varied 
as economic regulation, public health, land use, policing, environmental pro-
tection, education, public beneﬁts, and consumer welfare.
7
 It is no exaggera-
tion that almost every area of local governance operates through myriad zoning 
boards, education departments, police commissions, motor vehicle bureaus, so-
cial-service agencies, and similar institutions. If, as the introduction to a lead-
ing casebook on local-government law puts it, three core relationships have 
traditionally deﬁned the ﬁeld—those “between cities and higher levels of gov-
ernment, between neighboring cities, and between cities and the people who 
live within their boundaries”
8
—then local administration represents a crucial 
fourth relationship—between and among institutions within local govern-
ments. 
Political scientists, economists, and scholars of public management have 
long grappled with the interplay between bureaucracy and democracy at the 
 
6. There is a body of state administrative law scholarship that has produced notable contribu-
tions. See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW (4th ed. 2014); Michael Asimow, The Fourth Reform: Introduction to the Administrative 
Law Review Symposium on State Administrative Law, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 395 (2001); Arthur 
Earl Bonﬁeld, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297 (1986); Mi-
chael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their Impli-
cations for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977 (2008); Jim Rossi, 
Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 551 (2001); Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 83 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 555 (2014). As will be explored throughout the Article, this state-level adminis-
trative law can help explicate the contours of local-government practice, but the Article will 
focus on federal-local distinctions for the sake of clarifying contrast. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 66-74. 
    Before the rise of the modern administrative state, sub-federal institutions unsurpris-
ingly were more central to conceptions of administration, as the prominence of two turn-of-
the-century non-federal cases involving challenges to tax assessments—Londoner v. City & 
County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equali-
zation, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)—in the canon of administrative law suggests. Cf. Ronald A. Cass, 
Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363, 367-70 (1986) (discussing Londoner and 
Bi-Metallic as canonical polestars of models of administration that parallel adjudication and 
legislation). 
7. See infra Section III.A. 
8. GERALD E. FRUG, RICHARD T. FORD & DAVID J. BARRON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS vi (5th ed. 2010). 
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local level.
9
 Yet legal scholars have been oddly absent from this discourse, pay-
ing too little attention to the inner workings of local government in general
10
—
and even less to the important arena of local agency practice
11
—despite the vo-
luminous literature on administrative law and practice that predominates at the 
federal level. This is unfortunate, because the administrative state that exists at 
the local-government level—one might call it the administrative city-state—is 
every bit as worthy of scholarly examination as its more familiar federal coun-
terpart.
12
 
When one turns the lens on the metaphorical microscope, what does local 
administration actually look like? It is difficult to generalize, given the number 
and variety of local agencies, but several themes emerge. First, as noted, local 
agencies reﬂect the breadth of the work of local governments. Agencies are in-
volved in the delivery of core local services, such as education, policing, and 
sanitation, often the functions most closely identiﬁed with local governments.
13
 
But it is easy to forget that local governments also exercise signiﬁcant regulato-
 
9. See infra Part I. 
10. Much of the literature on local-government law falls into two broad categories. In the ﬁrst, 
paralleling Frug, Ford, and Barron’s typology, see FRUG, FORD & BARRON, supra note 8, 
scholars focus on transsubstantive determinants of local legal identity. This strand of the lit-
erature tends to examine issues such as authority, autonomy, boundaries, incorporation, and 
the like. A second category focuses on speciﬁc areas of policy concern, such as land use, edu-
cation, policing, public beneﬁts, and the like. Although both of these strands of the literature 
are important, this Article argues for a more explicitly institutionalist approach, because 
questions of internal governmental structure matter at the local level no less than at the fed-
eral level. See infra Part I. 
11. Paul Diller’s work on local public-health agencies is a rare (and excellent) recent exception. 
See Diller, supra note 2; see also Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Impli-
cations of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219 (2014). 
    Local administrative law was once not quite as obscure a ﬁeld of inquiry. In the early 
1960s, Bernie Burrus published a slim but insightful book on local administration, seeking 
(it turned out, sadly, in vain) to spark a broader discourse about the subject. See BERNIE R. 
BURRUS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1963); see also Max A. Pock, Ad-
ministrative Law and Local Government, 43 TEX. L. REV. 123, 123 (1964) (reviewing BURRUS, 
supra). In addition to Burrus’s now largely forgotten volume, Harry Wallace, the respected 
former Dean of Indiana Law School, published more than one edition of his casebook on the 
subject, with the ﬁnal edition appearing in 1972. See LEON HARRY WALLACE, LOCAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1972). 
12. In essence, local agency practice is local governance. As Niels Ejersbo and James Svara have 
argued, “[b]ureaucracy constitutes the core organizational capacity of local governments to 
carry out the government’s work of enforcing laws, implementing policies, and delivering 
services.” Niels Ejersbo & James H. Svara, Bureaucracy and Democracy in Local Government, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF URBAN POLITICS 152, 152 (Karen Mossberger, Susan E. Clarke & 
Peter John eds., 2012). 
13. See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 85-86 (1998) (discussing the most 
common local services). 
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ry authority, delegated from the state government or under “home rule.”
14
 Lo-
cal agencies, for example, set the rules and oversee the functioning of many as-
pects of the built environment—through zoning, subdivision rules, building 
and housing codes, and similar statutory regimes. They also regulate signiﬁ-
cant aspects of local economies, including wage and hour rules, workplace con-
ditions, and antidiscrimination requirements. And an increasingly important 
aspect of local regulation involves the environment. Much of local agencies’ 
work across policy areas happens through licensing,
15
 but local agencies also 
engage in traditional direct regulation.
16
 
If this is what local agencies do, what can be discerned about the legal and 
institutional contexts in which they operate? Local agencies are not simply jun-
ior-league counterparts to federal agencies. While there are some local gov-
ernments—particularly in larger cities such as New York—that have surface re-
semblance to the federal three-branch paradigm, most have distinctly different 
structures.
17
 For example, many local governments have little or no formal sep-
aration of powers, with lawmaking authority often vested in a uniﬁed legisla-
tive-executive body. The “mayor” in these jurisdictions, if there is one, is just 
another council member. Even for those local governments that have a recog-
nizable independent chief executive, that executive’s ability to directly oversee 
 
14. David Barron and Gerald Frug have argued that the scope of local authority is not a Mani-
chean all-or-nothing divide between empowerment and disability, but rather a more subtle 
interplay of both. See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE 
URBAN INNOVATION (2008). Frug and Barron tend to ignore a third source of authority and 
limitation at the local-government level, deriving from the federal government’s local role. 
See Nestor M. Davidson, Leaps and Bounds, 108 MICH. L. REV. 957, 965 (2010) (reviewing 
FRUG & BARRON, supra); see also Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local 
Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959 (2007) (exploring the role of 
federal authority at the local level). 
15. When Bernie Burrus set out to explicate the then-state of local administrative law in the 
1960s, he chose licensing as his paradigm example. See BURRUS, supra note 11, at 41-71. The 
use of franchise authority is another prominent regulatory strategy at the local level. See 
Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 828-29 (2012) (discussing local ca-
ble franchise agreements as a form of regulation). 
16. See infra Section III.A.1. 
17. See Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 
U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 341 (1993) (“Local government is strikingly different from other levels 
of government, and not simply because local governments are territorially smaller. Local 
government organization does not abide by the ‘plain vanilla’ model characteristic of state or 
federal government: a single legislative body with general lawmaking powers over a broad 
jurisdiction with democratic accountability to the residents of that jurisdiction. Instead, spe-
cialization, fragmentation, overlap, and boundary change are pervasive characteristics of our 
local government structure . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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agencies is often circumscribed.
18
 And many local agencies are subject to quite 
limited electoral accountability, reporting to the state or entirely lacking a rele-
vant, direct electoral mechanism of any sort.
19
 
While some local agencies, moreover, are well staffed and operate as for-
mally as any federal agency, local administration tends to work more informal-
ly. Indeed, the precise procedural requirements binding local agencies are often 
surprisingly murky.
20
 Local agencies also often operate at the edge of a blurry 
line between governmental action and public participation. Community en-
gagement in zoning regulation, school board decisions, police review commis-
sions, and other examples of the blending of public and private underscore the 
breadth of citizen participation in local agency work that is uncommon at the 
federal level.
21
 And local-government functions can be entirely privatized, in-
cluding some administration. All of these variations inform this Article’s ﬁrst 
aim—providing a descriptive foundation to understand the nature and work of 
local administration. 
Shifting from this empirical grounding to doctrinal questions, this Article 
argues that these features of local agency context and practice should shape a 
new, distinctly localist administrative jurisprudence.
22
 Courts—and it is mostly 
state courts that review local agency action—engage in judicial review across a 
variety of contexts, from statutory interpretation, to substantive agency poli-
cymaking, to policing the bounds of procedural regularity.
23
 When they do, 
they should attend to four particularly salient aspects of the local context. 
 
18. Many mayors, for example, entirely lack appointment and/or removal power over the heads 
of local administrative agencies. See infra text accompanying notes 168-171. 
19. Indeed, the fact that local agencies answer both to their own local governments and to the 
state is a distinctive feature of local administration. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1867-83. 
20. Many local agencies are not bound by state Administrative Procedure Acts, although that 
does not mean that they are entirely free from procedural constraints. See infra text accom-
panying notes 188-193. As a result, local agencies have been a particular ﬂashpoint for due 
process concerns. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Londoner v. City & Cty. of 
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
21. This is not to ignore the inﬂuence of private actors on federal agencies, which is a recurring 
concern in the discourse on agency capture and independence. See Jody Freeman, The Pri-
vate Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551-64 (2000). Rather, it is to highlight 
the porous line between public and private as a particularly prominent local feature. 
22. Administrative law generally encompasses questions such as the authority and structure of 
agencies, procedural requirements for agency action, the general validity of agency deci-
sions, and judicial review of agency actions. In explicating the contours of a localist adminis-
trative law, this Article focuses on judicial review as a ﬁrst step, but the insights developed 
are relevant to other aspects of administrative law. See infra Section V.C. 
23. Judicial review of local agencies parallels federal administrative law in the sense that litigants 
challenge rulemaking, administrative adjudication, enforcement decisions, and other ac-
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First, rather than importing federal—or even state—administrative law 
norms wholesale, courts should be clear-eyed about the doctrinal implications 
of local governmental structure and the complex nature of delegated authority 
for local agencies.
24
 Courts should consider, for example, whether limits on ex-
ecutive oversight militate against deference, or whether the absence of separa-
tion of powers in a local government might change the nature of the nondele-
gation doctrine. Similarly, the fact that many local agencies have two layers of 
oversight—by their local and state governments—may mitigate concerns about 
capture, corruption, and faithless agents. In these and many other ways, the 
details of local governmental structure matter for judicial review.
25
 
Second, courts should be sensitive to the contexts for formality and infor-
mality in the work of local agencies. In most instances, as with the approach 
that courts take when scaling deference in reviewing federal administration,
26
 
formality should be accorded judicial respect. Where an agency has acted 
through legislatively prescribed procedure or adopted careful processes of its 
own, with substantial evidence when appropriate, that should merit deference, 
all other things being equal. On the other hand, more so than at the federal lev-
el, there are contexts where the relative informality of local practice, particularly 
to the extent that such informality reﬂects community involvement, may be 
consistent with norms of considered judgment.
27
 
Third, courts should be attentive to the role of private parties and the 
community in local administration. The scope of private involvement—both 
within traditionally governmental entities and through privatization—can be a 
rationale for the kind of vigorous nondelegation doctrine seen in local adminis-
trative law (by stark contrast to federal law). But the porous line between pub-
lic and private at the local level can also weigh in favor of a more pragmatic ap-
proach to nondelegation, so long as that approach is undertaken with 
appropriate caution.
28
 
Finally, reviewing courts should take a nuanced view of local agency exper-
tise. In some contexts, this is as straightforward as crediting local technical ex-
perts, as with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, a 
nationally recognized leader in public health. In other contexts, however, agen-
 
tions. Speciﬁc context matters procedurally and substantively, but the framework in this Ar-
ticle identiﬁes common themes that can shape that review across contexts. 
24. Many factors that shape local administrative law are grounded in state laws that at times do 
not clearly distinguish state and local institutions. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.1. 
25. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
26. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001). 
27. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
28. See infra Section IV.A.3. 
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cies serve less as a repository of technical expertise and more as a mediating 
body to channel local input and knowledge. This is still valuable expertise, but 
of a different sort than the kind of scientiﬁc or industry-speciﬁc knowledge 
with which courts credit federal agencies.
29
 
Beyond jurisprudence, a ﬁnal aim of this Article is to begin to illuminate 
ways in which the intersection of localism and administration has deep rele-
vance for the literature in each domain. For scholars of local-government law, 
focusing on the work of agencies adds a layer of institutional depth to long-
standing debates balancing local authority, community, democracy, and exper-
imentalism against concerns about parochialism and exclusion.
30
 For adminis-
trative law scholars, adding an understanding of local administration to debates 
that are largely focused on the federal level complicates questions of the institu-
tional predicates for administrative legitimacy, but also holds promise for de-
veloping a more coherent administrative law across the entire range of our ver-
tical federalist system.
31
 
*** 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins as prologue, explaining in 
more depth the signiﬁcance of the scholarly gap at the intersection of admin-
istration and local governance. Part II then turns to the largely federal predi-
cates—structural, doctrinal, and conceptual—that animate mainstream admin-
istrative law and theory, to lay a comparative foundation. Part III shifts to the 
local, outlining the nature, function, and varied governmental-structural con-
text of local agencies. Part IV builds on this empirical grounding to frame a ju-
risprudence of administrative law that foregrounds what is distinctive about 
local practice, illustrating its impact through two examples: reasonableness re-
view and the nondelegation doctrine. Finally, Part V returns to the theoretical 
lacunae at the intersection of localism and administration, exploring implica-
tions for legal theory. This exercise holds important lessons about institutional 
structure, judicial oversight, and agency process in the administrative state that 
cannot be learned solely from studying the federal government, with signiﬁ-
cant consequences for our understanding of administrative legitimacy and, 
more broadly, the nature of governance. 
i .  a double lacuna: local/administration 
To situate this Article, it is important to recognize that there is a missing fo-
cus on the institutions of administration in local-government legal scholarship 
 
29. See infra Section IV.A.4. 
30. See infra Section V.A. 
31. See infra Section V.B. 
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and a corresponding missing focus on localism in administrative law scholar-
ship. This double lacuna weakens both ﬁelds. 
In local-government law, two broad themes tend to deﬁne the literature. 
First, legal scholars have long focused on questions of local legal authority and 
identity. In this vein, scholars have fruitfully explored the nature and limits of 
local autonomy, primarily in the context of the local-state relationship, but also 
in terms of the horizontal intergovernmental context in which local govern-
ments operate.
32
 As a conceptual matter, much of this scholarship engages with 
the nature of community and democracy in local governance, balancing those 
values with the risks of parochialism, externalities, and exclusion.
33
 
A second strain in the local-government literature focuses less on legal 
identity and more on particular policy domains prominent at the local level. In 
this vein, scholars have engaged at times with administrative law in speciﬁc ar-
eas such as public health,
34
 land use,
35
 and public beneﬁts,
36
 but there has been 
 
32. Thus, not only the state-local relationship—in scholarship on topics such as home rule and 
local legal identity—but also the legal determinants of interlocal relationships and regional-
ism are prominent areas of exploration. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Govern-
ment, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bar-
gains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190 (2001). A notable sub-theme of this focus on local authority 
and autonomy is local-government scale, including important work on local borders, see, 
e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geog-
raphy in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994), and the related area of annexation 
and dissolution practices, see, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 
1364 (2012). Another notable aspect of local legal autonomy involves the question of the 
immunity of local officials. See Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
409 (2016). For further discussion of local authority, autonomy, and legal identity, see infra 
Section III.B.1. 
33. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (2014); Frug, 
supra note 13. 
34. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 11 (exploring in depth the structural and procedural predicates for 
local innovation in public health). 
35. See, e.g., Adam J. MacLeod, Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation, 101 KY. L.J. 55 (2012) 
(discussing administration and judicial review in land-use regulation); Daniel P. Selmi, The 
Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 591 (2011) (outlining con-
temporary land-use regulatory practice and arguing for cabining its increasingly individual-
ized nature). 
36. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and En-
trepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000) (examining a shift in administrative 
structure following welfare reform in the mid-1990s toward vesting front-line agency actors 
with increasing discretion). 
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almost no scholarship that has attempted to knit these insights together across 
the range of substantive local domains.
37
 
As valuable as this macroscale local governance and individual policy area 
focused literature is, the internal institutions of local governance should also 
matter for scholars of local government.
38
 The same questions of governmental 
structure and organization that are the staple of so much of the legal literature 
on administrative law and separation of powers at the federal level are worthy 
of exploring within the conﬁnes of local governments. Scholarship on federal 
separation of powers and administrative law takes as a foundation, albeit fre-
quently implicit, that structure is critically important to understanding the na-
ture of federal governance and that agency practice should inform administra-
tive jurisprudence. Those same concerns should be equally relevant at the local 
level. 
There has been some engagement in the legal literature with the nature of 
mayoral power, as part of bringing questions of internal structure to the larger 
debate about the authority and efficacy of local governments.
39
 Other scholars 
have examined the link between the structure of local governance generally and 
ﬁscal or other speciﬁc policy outcomes.
40
 And recent work has begun to apply 
insights from positive political theory to questions of local-government law, 
highlighting local institutional dynamics and allocation of authority.
41
 This 
 
37. In arguing for a transsubstantive focus on internal institutions at the local-government level, 
this prologue should not be read to dismiss scholarship that engages with local administra-
tive structure in particular subject-matter contexts. Rather, this is to argue for transsubstan-
tive engagement with local internal structure and administrative law in particular, similar to 
the transsubstantive work on federal and state administration. 
38. This assertion echoes David Schleicher’s argument that scholars of local government should 
be more attentive to emerging trends in economics and political science. See David Schlei-
cher, Local Government Law’s “Law and ___” Problem, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1951 (2013) 
(decrying the absence of engagement with the urban agglomeration economics and positive 
political science literature in local-government legal scholarship). 
39. Compare, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Can Municipal Political Structure Improve Fiscal Perfor-
mance?, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 571, 576-82 (2014) (arguing for the value of a strong-
mayor system in ﬁscal affairs), with Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak 
Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2555-64 (2006) 
(arguing that even strong mayors are subordinate to the limits of local authority). See gener-
ally Schragger, supra, at 2546 (noting that “almost nothing has been written about the 
mayoralty in the legal literature”). 
40. See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Mu-
nicipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150 (2016) (examining the causes and consequences of the 
fragmentation of local budget authority in the context of judicial oversight of municipal 
bankruptcy). 
41. See, e.g., David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1699-1717 (2013) (analyzing 
the interaction of law, politics, and procedure in urban land use); see also David Schleicher, 
Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 
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scholarship, however, largely focuses on political leadership and not on the 
agencies and other internal institutions that perform much of the actual work 
of local governments.
42
 No one could reasonably suggest that the institutional 
context of federal law is irrelevant—indeed, much of the scholarship of admin-
istrative law at the federal level proceeds from precisely the opposite assump-
tion.
 43
 
The absence of deep engagement by legal scholars with the internal func-
tioning of local governments is all the more striking when compared to the lit-
erature in political science, economics, public management, and urban affairs. 
That scholarship has long sought to develop frameworks for assessing links be-
tween structure and policy outcomes. Across several disciplines, a new institu-
tionalist perspective has emerged that has focused intently on local governance. 
In political science, for example, there is a body of empirical and theoretical lit-
erature that seeks to categorize and understand the consequences of the varie-
ties of local-government structure.
44
 Similarly, in new institutional economics, 
scholars have examined internal public agency function.
45
 And a prominent 
vein of the public administration literature takes as its point of departure that 
the structure of the institutions of local governance is signiﬁcant.
46
 There is no 
need here to rehearse this interdisciplinary institutional literature in depth—
suffice it to say (for the moment) that in closely cognate ﬁelds, scholars recog-
 
J.L. & POL. 419, 423-26 (2007) [hereinafter Schleicher, No Partisan Competition] (exploring 
the role of law in local electoral dynamics); Kenneth A. Stahl, The Artiﬁce of Local Growth 
Politics: At-Large Elections, Ballot-Box Zoning, and Judicial Review, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2010) 
(analyzing the effect of structure in local politics on municipal economic growth). 
42. At least one local-government-law casebook does include a brief discussion of local admin-
istration, although noting the dearth of scholarship in the area. See LYNN A. BAKER, CLAY-
TON P. GILLETTE & DAVID SCHLEICHER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
777-79 (5th ed. 2015).  
43. Calls for an “institutional turn” have been made in other areas of legal scholarship. See, e.g., 
PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David 
Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 96 (2015) (arguing for an “‘in-
stitutional turn’ towards the predicted political behavior of legislatures, bureaucrats, and ex-
ecutive politicians” in property theory). 
44. See, e.g., Victor S. DeSantis & Tari Renner, City Government Structures: An Attempt at Clariﬁ-
cation, in THE FUTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: THE HANSELL SYMPOSIUM 
71 (H.G. Frederickson & J. Nalbandian eds., 2002). 
45. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics 
Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (1999) (analyzing how public bureaucracies compare 
to private bureaucracies in handling sovereign transactions). 
46. See, e.g., Kimberly L. Nelson & James H. Svara, Form of Government Still Matters: Fostering 
Innovation in U.S. Municipal Governments, 42 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 257, 257 (2012) (noting 
that the “form of government remains an important variable to consider when investigating 
local-government management and performance”). 
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nize that the internal structures of local governance matter as a theoretical and 
practical matter.
47
 
On the other hand, if the internal workings of cities, suburbs, counties, and 
towns should matter to legal scholars, so too should doctrine matter to institu-
tionalists in other academic disciplines. Scholars examining local governance in 
political science, economics, public management, and other ﬁelds too often 
proceed without sufficient recognition of legal constraints. Indeed, the argu-
ment that Gerald Frug and David Barron have made about interdisciplinary 
misunderstanding of the mottled nature of the authority of local govern-
ments—that urban theorists need a better understanding of actual local legal 
identity—holds equally true for the comprehension by scholars in other ﬁelds 
of the legal landscape of the internal dimension of local governance.
48
 How 
does delegation of authority work within local governments? What limits do 
courts impose on the ability of local governments to promulgate regulations? 
What kinds of procedural norms are required for agency actions to survive ju-
dicial scrutiny? Again, this is the ordinary work of federal administrative law, 
but all too often ignored at the local-government level. 
The case for focusing on local governments for scholars of administrative 
law is easier to articulate, but no less compelling. Mainstream administrative 
law, as noted,
49
 has attended somewhat to state-level agency action and judicial 
review, but has almost entirely ignored the sub-state level as an independent 
arena worthy of study. Most law school courses titled “Administrative Law” are, 
in fact, courses on “Federal Administrative Law,” with the general exception of 
segments on procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
50
 Most 
scholarship in administrative law is federal in its focus as well.
51
 
 
47. But see Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and 
Practitioners, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 788, 793 (2012) (noting that policy diffusion studies ig-
nore “decisions made by executive agencies”). 
48. See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 14, at 12-23 (arguing that the interdisciplinary discourse on 
urban policy lacks an appreciation of the legal foundation for local power). 
49. See supra note 6. 
50. The Londoner/Bi-Metallic due process distinction arose from challenges to state and local 
administrative processes. See supra note 6. While it is true that some casebooks deal more 
broadly with state administrative law, e.g., ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 6, examples of deep 
engagement with sub-federal administration are outliers. 
51. The footnote necessary to substantiate this claim would run for volumes, but suffice it to say 
that even a casual glance at the work product of the Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS) Section on Administrative Law (or any similar shorthand for administrative law 
scholars) would reinforce that the predominance of work is on federal agencies and the fed-
eral institutional context. This is so internalized by most administrative law scholars that it 
is common to see the federal government assumed to be the administrative state. See, e.g., 
Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State, 
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Including a local perspective in that scholarship would fulﬁll two impera-
tives, one unifying and one grounded in the value of understanding institu-
tional pluralism. As to highlighting continuity in administrative law, adding 
localism to administrative scholarship would allow for the exploration of com-
mon themes in new institutional settings, shedding light on a set of long-
standing debates to which we will be turning momentarily. At the same time, 
however, this additional layer would provide new grounds to complicate long-
standing assumptions about the implications of federal structure and practice.
52
 
i i .  a federal baseline for a vertical comparative 
perspective 
To understand what is distinctive about local administration, it is useful to 
lay down a comparative baseline with a brief overview of the federal paradigm. 
This Part accordingly starts with the structural predicates for mainstream ad-
ministrative law’s federal focus and then turns to the jurisprudential themes 
that have emerged from those predicates.
53
 
A. The Structural Predicates of Administrative Law’s Federal Focus 
The reigning preoccupations of administrative law have settled into a rough 
stasis around certain core debates—however contentious they may remain—
about the nature of agency decision making, the tenor of judicial review, execu-
tive oversight, and other aspects of administrative legitimacy. These concerns 
will be explored in depth below as they pertain to administrative jurispru-
dence.
54
 But before turning to doctrine, it bears noting that the essential insti-
 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 1986 & n.9 (2015) (citing only the federal paradigm to argue that 
“our form of government is, importantly, administrative government”). Even scholarship 
that purports to broaden the focus beyond the federal government often reverts back to the 
federal paradigm. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Pro-
cess, 100 VA. L. REV. 953 (2014) (discussing the role of state interest groups in shaping feder-
al regulations). 
52. These arguments will be spelled out in more detail below. See infra Section V.B. 
53. As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 66-74, this Section frames the baseline 
for a comparison between federal administration and local administration as a way of high-
lighting contrasts between these two levels of our federal system, acknowledging that state 
administrative law provides an intermediate institutional layer. To frame the contrast be-
tween the local and the federal is not to ignore the importance of the states—or the reality 
that much of “local” administrative law is inextricably intertwined with state-level law and 
institutions, but rather to highlight the absence of any sustained engagement with local ad-
ministration as such in the contemporary administrative law literature. 
54. See infra Section IV.B. 
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tutional assumptions that undergird these mainstream administrative law de-
bates derive from the federal-government context. These institutional assump-
tions may be obvious, and we need not tarry long to catalogue them in detail, 
but they all too often simply go unacknowledged as a baseline paradigm for our 
understanding of administrative law. 
The ﬁrst, most basic, structural assumption is the familiar three-branch 
structure of the federal government. Thus, administrative law is understood as 
the domain of agencies within the federal executive branch, operating under 
Article II authority. Scholars have long debated the extent to which certain 
agencies do or should operate independently of the President,
55
 and even in the 
context of central cabinet agencies, the legitimacy of direct presidential control 
over the regulatory state remains controversial.
56
 But from the perspective of 
democratic accountability and executive oversight, there is no question that 
mainstream administrative law assumes that there is a single, elected executive 
overseeing a recognizable executive branch. 
Mainstream separation of powers principles also understand agencies to be 
operating under express or implied delegations from Congress.
57
 This is foun-
 
55. These agencies are considered “independent” in the sense of enjoying statutory limitations 
on the President’s powers, with respect to either the appointment of inferior officers or the 
removal of relevant agency heads. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.16 (2013) (presenting several characterizations of agency independ-
ence). 
56. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Adminis-
trative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 485-92 (2003) (arguing that presidential control is the 
“dominant” model of administrative oversight); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential 
Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 686-87 (2016) (surveying the literature on federal executive 
oversight of the administrative state and arguing for reorienting administrative law to better 
cabin this oversight). Compare, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245 (2001) (defending presidential control of federal administration), with, e.g., Kevin 
M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 
(2006) (arguing that the President only has the authority to direct agency action when ex-
pressly authorized by statute), and Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) (arguing that “in 
ordinary administrative law contexts, where Congress has assigned a function to a named 
agency subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President’s role—like 
that of the Congress and the courts—is that of overseer and not decider”). On debates about 
the unitary executive at the federal level, see generally HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORC-
ES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 446-48 (2006), which dis-
cusses judicial and scholarly views on the unitary executive; and STEVEN G. CALABRESI & 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON 
TO BUSH (2008), which advocates unitary executive theory. 
57. Congressional oversight of administrative agencies is another important theme in the litera-
ture and in practice. See generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 61 (2006) (discussing the various means by which Congress inﬂuences admin-
istration). 
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dational to so much of the structure of agency authority and informs a variety 
of doctrines of judicial review, such as the calibration of levels of deference and 
the all-but-toothless federal nondelegation doctrine.
58
 Likewise, federal consti-
tutional principles of limited and enumerated powers inform, at least at the 
margins, the scope of authority that can be granted from Congress to agencies. 
As a practical matter, however, the outer bounds of Congress’s authority have 
rarely been meaningfully tested since the New Deal.
59
 
As with these formal predicates, functional perspectives on administrative 
law likewise often default to the basics of the federal agency paradigm as well. 
Thus, federal agencies such as the EPA, OSHA, or the SEC are assumed to have 
a certain technical expertise, grounded in the work of relatively well-resourced, 
sophisticated staff.
60
 Conversely, these agencies are seen as perennially at risk of 
capture by regulated industries operating within the scope of national poli-
tics.
61
 This is a fairly basic point, but one that too often goes without noting.
62
 
From a procedural perspective, ﬁnally, federal agencies share a uniﬁed 
grounding for the variety of their actions, provided by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).
63
 Federal agencies have a range of policymaking options for 
undertaking administrative action—including formal and informal rulemaking, 
sub-regulatory guidance, formal and informal adjudication, and enforcement 
actions. All of these forms of administrative action are broadly constrained 
within a common and fairly clear statutory (and administrative common law) 
 
58. See infra Section IV.B. 
59. There are pockets of jurisprudence that set some very broad outer boundaries under the 
banner of the constraints of federalism, the limits of the Commerce Clause, or the like, see, 
e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997), but given the breadth of federal regulation, these outer boundaries are 
rarely approached. In some sense, the federal government and local governments share a 
conceptual kinship as governments of supposedly limited and delegated authority—unlike 
the states—but as a practical matter, limits to authority are much more of a salient reality for 
local governments than such limits have been for the federal government since the New 
Deal. 
60. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1286 (2008) (noting 
that “[a]dministrative agencies’ superior experience and expertise in particular regulatory 
ﬁelds” is a common justiﬁcation for judicial deference). 
61. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013) (arguing that the commonness of regulatory capture pro-
vides normative support for executive review of agency action). 
62. The geographic scope of federal administration is also generally taken as a given, and not 
much usually turns on this fact for federal agencies. By contrast, of course, the geographic 
boundedness and fragmentary nature of local governance is salient for local agencies. See in-
fra Section III.B.2. 
63. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
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framework.
64
 There are variations, to be sure, but the basic procedural terms 
share a well-understood and routinized vocabulary.
65
 
There is an intermediate governmental level to consider between the rela-
tive uniformity of federal administrative law and, as we shall see momentarily, 
the tremendous variety found at the local level.
66
 As scholars have noted, sever-
al of the structural constitutional features underlying federal administration 
doctrine can be different at the state level.
67
 Unlike Article III judges, for exam-
 
64. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386 n.2 
(2004) (“[The APA] provides a common default framework, one that contemplates nearly 
all of the categories [of administrative action], that guides almost every agency in at least 
some contexts. Centralized White House review of agency activity likewise tracks at least 
some of the categories identiﬁed here. As such, one can talk sensibly about a standard set of 
policymaking forms as a matter of practice.”). Administrative common law refers to the 
body of practice that has become standard on top of the framework of the APA. For exam-
ple, the APA does not speak to what public reporting is required for rulemaking, but agen-
cies generally keep records given the nature of judicial review. See generally Gillian E. Metz-
ger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2012) 
(describing and defending the existence of administrative common law). 
65. At the local level, the line between public and private can be relatively permeable—generally 
and in administrative practice—compared to the federal level. See infra Sections III.C.2, 
IV.A.1. Tensions over private involvement in administration are not entirely foreign to feder-
al administrative law, however, as the jurisprudence on private nondelegation makes clear. 
See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding 
that a statute requiring the Federal Railroad Administration to develop standards jointly 
with Amtrak, a private entity, constituted an unconstitutional private delegation), rev’d, 135 
S. Ct. 1225 (2015) (ﬁnding that Amtrak is a governmental entity); see also Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (holding that a delegation of regulatory power to coal 
producers and miners violated the Fifth Amendment). 
66. See, e.g., Pappas, supra note 6, at 984 (surveying the extent and possible drawbacks of Chev-
ron-style deference to state agencies); Saiger, supra note 6, at 557-59 (same); see also WIL-
LIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION 1258-61 (4th ed. 2007). And this is not to say that state-level administrative law 
parrots federal law by any means. The literature on state-level variations makes clear that 
norms of deference and other core principles differ at the state level and among the states. 
    One could also shift vertically in the other direction and add international administra-
tive law to the comparative exercise, see Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field of Internation-
al Administrative Law: Its Content and Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 417-27 (2002), but the 
institutional structures that inﬂuence doctrinal concerns at the supranational level make 
comparison with the local difficult. 
67. See Rossi, supra note 6, at 554-60; Saiger, supra note 6, at 560-70. Much of the work on state 
administrative law takes a comparative perspective similar to the federal-local contrast in 
this Article, examining the foundational features of federal structure and the consequences 
of state variations from these features, and a similar literature on differences—and similari-
ties—between the federal APA and the range of state APAs. See, e.g., Bonﬁeld, supra note 6; 
see also Jim Rossi, Politics, Institutions, and Administrative Procedure: What Exactly Do We 
Know from the Empirical Study of State Level APAs, and What More Can We Learn?, 58 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 961 (2006) (discussing the institutional context for state level APAs). 
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ple, not all state judges are appointed and serve for life. Rather, many state 
judges are elected, face mandatory retirement, or are subject to other forms of 
political accountability.
68
 Many states, moreover, have multiple sources of exec-
utive authority beyond the governor. State officials, including the lieutenant 
governor, the attorney general, and a variety of other state-level authorities, are 
independently elected in some states, rather than chosen by the chief execu-
tive.
69
 And state legislatures can play a different role than Congress, some 
meeting much less frequently, for much less time, and also subject to much 
greater turnover (for better or worse).
70
 There are, of course, other state-level 
structures—as well as aspects of state statutory law—that differ from the feder-
al paradigm, although states at a sufficiently broad remove tend to resemble 
more closely the federal structure than local governments.
71
 Moreover, it is im-
portant to acknowledge that many “local” administrative structures are inextri-
cably bound up in state law and institutions.
72
 
Despite the relevance of the states to local administration, this Article is 
framed primarily around the federal-local contrast for several reasons. First, the 
parsimony of the contrast (and comparison) with the federal is more clarifying 
than attempting to map the range of local variations against ﬁfty states—the 
comparative conﬁgurations are almost endless, although worthy of further ex-
ploration.
73
 Next, a federal-local juxtaposition helps to isolate and illustrate 
what is distinctive about the local, even if that tends to elide intermediate simi-
larities at the state level for the sake of clarity. And, ﬁnally, notwithstanding the 
importance of state practice, federal predicates still generally set the terms of 
mainstream administrative law discourse about judicial review, agency process, 
mechanisms of accountability, concerns about capture, and similar core ques-
tions.
74
 
 
68. Saiger, supra note 6, at 561-62. As Saiger notes, this arguably makes some state judges at 
least partially a “political branch.” Id. at 561 (citing Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, 
Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1249-54, 1277-82 (2012)). 
69. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 
1433 tbl.4 (2008) (charting the variety of state executive officials that are elected separately 
from governors); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys 
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2449-68 (2006) (discuss-
ing the practice and implications of independent state attorneys general). 
70. See Rossi, supra note 6, at 555-57. 
71. As with local governments, there are structural and practical commonalities between state 
and federal administrative practice. 
72. See infra Section III.C.1 (discussing the varied application of state APAs to local agencies). 
73. See infra Section V.C. 
74. Hopefully, adding local administration to the discourse can reinforce the importance of state 
administration as well. 
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B. (Federal) Themes in the Administrative Law Discourse 
If a very familiar federal structure undergirds much of our understanding 
of administration, an equally familiar set of jurisprudential and theoretical con-
cerns ﬂows from that structure. Generally speaking, mainstream administrative 
law—particularly in the context of judicial review of agency action—revolves 
around a core set of formal and functional arguments. Common formal 
grounds for structuring judicial review derive from the basic implications of 
separation of powers principles, including explicit or implicit legislative delega-
tion. Functional arguments for judicial deference are more varied, but the most 
prominent balance a tension between technical expertise and agency accounta-
bility against concerns about capture, myopia, and agency insulation.
75
 
Within the federal sphere, administrative law for the bulk of the twentieth 
century could aptly be described as a quest for legitimacy. For a half-century or 
more after the New Deal, as the federal administrative state grew, the exercise 
of governmental power by bureaucratic actors—as opposed to those more di-
rectly accountable to the voters—stood in need of justiﬁcation. This need was 
particularly salient with respect to agencies whose statutory mandates were 
written in broad and open-ended terms. The Supreme Court abandoned the 
nondelegation doctrine as a basis for invalidating statutes sometime after 1935
76
 
and instead embraced a string of increasingly lenient frameworks—most nota-
bly the “intelligible principle” test. These frameworks allow Congress, in es-
sence, to confer quasi-legislative power on agencies within broad limits.
77
 It 
would be fair to describe much of administrative law—including, notably, the 
APA—as an elaborate substitute mechanism for enforcing the values that pre-
viously underlay the nondelegation doctrine.
78
 
 
75. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 437 (2003) (describing the various models of administrative law in the United States 
and assessing the emerging responses to regulatory fatigue aimed at rejuvenating adminis-
trative agency processes). 
76. See supra Section II.A (discussing nondelegation at the federal level). 
77. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (permitting broad 
delegation of legislative authority under the “intelligible principle” standard); see also 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (same); Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (same). But see Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 
U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion) (using the canon of constitutional avoidance to read a 
broad congressional delegation narrowly); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (same). 
78. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331-37 (2000) (de-
scribing pervasive techniques of statutory interpretation used by courts in administrative 
law cases to enforce the underlying values of the nondelegation doctrine). 
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As delegation retreated into the background, other doctrines, primarily at 
the constitutional level, arose as proxies for legitimation.
79
 The Court, for ex-
ample, imposed limits on the ability of Congress to vest itself with the power to 
appoint
80
 and remove
81
 certain agency officials as well as to override agency ac-
tion through legislative resolutions that failed to conform to the requirements 
of bicameralism and presentment.
82
 Conversely, the Court affirmed Congress’s 
authority to insulate some agencies from direct presidential control by limiting 
the President’s power to remove inferior agency officers.
83
 The separation of 
powers landscape this constitutional settlement created eventually became 
clear: Congress was free to vest agencies with broad policymaking discretion 
and a mix of rulemaking, investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicative authori-
ty, and could shelter some agency heads from direct presidential control, so 
long as Congress did not unduly enlarge its own power at the expense of the 
other two branches in the process. 
With this approach by the Court, the task of vindicating the accountability 
and rule-of-law values associated with the nondelegation doctrine largely fell to 
procedural legislation and executive oversight. The major landmark in this re-
gard was the enactment of the APA. This framework statute was a lawyerly re-
action to the explosion of regulatory activity during the New Deal.
84
 The APA 
was designed to impose procedural regularity on federal agencies while sub-
jecting their ﬁnal actions to a presumption of judicial review under standards 
largely borrowed from earlier judicial practice. Presidents have likewise sought 
to introduce uniformity and centralization to the administrative process 
 
79. There is a separate line of arguably more robust federal cases that involves the delegation of 
adjudicatory, rather than legislative, authority. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
80. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 
501 U.S. 252, 275-77 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (per curiam). 
81. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
82. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-52 (1983). 
83. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-93 (1988) (upholding a “good cause” statutory 
standard for the removal of an inferior officer); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 
(1958) (upholding a statute that insulated commissioners from presidential removal); 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. 
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (invalidating a statutory system that 
provided for two levels of “good cause” removal restrictions). 
84. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Procedure Legislation in 1946 and 1996: Should We 
Be Jubilant at This Jubilee?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 55, 63 (1996) (underlining the comparatively apo-
litical “lawyerly concerns that underlay the original APA”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things 
Are Like Reasons Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 17, 24 (2001) (describing the APA as the statutory reaction to a perceived “adminis-
trative absolutism” (citing Roscoe Pound, Administrative Law: Its Growth, Procedure, and Sig-
niﬁcance, 7 PITT. L. REV. 269, 280 (1941))). 
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through executive orders, most notably Executive Order 12,866 and its succes-
sors, which channel major proposed rules to the White House for “regulatory 
impact analysis,” including cost-beneﬁt review.
85
 
Below the constitutional level, courts have policed bureaucratic legitimacy, 
although courts and commentators debate the appropriate standard (or, in APA 
terms, “scope”
86
) of judicial review. The APA, offering only a laundry list of 
standards of review in § 706(2), was of little help.
87
 In 1984, the Supreme 
Court in Chevron announced the now-routine two-step method for reviewing 
agency interpretations of statutes: the clear meaning of the statute controls, but 
agencies get wide deference for reasonable interpretations in the absence of 
statutory clarity.
88
 Alongside Chevron, courts from the 1960s onward attempted 
to promote transparency and rationality of the administrative process by 
strengthening the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard, often in the form 
of “hard-look” review of discretionary agency judgments.
89
 
There are, of course, many other important themes in the jurisprudence of 
federal administrative law, including the procedural due process “revolution” of 
the 1970s,
90
 the tightening of reviewability doctrines such as standing in the 
1980s and 1990s,
91
 and the inquiry into “preemption by regulation” in the 
twenty-ﬁrst century.
92
 However, at the federal level, it is safe to say that the 
basic dynamic of challenging and then reinforcing administrative legitimacy, as 
well as tensions over attempts to control administrative processes and results 
through presidential oversight and judicial review, have yielded a rough settle-
 
85. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
86. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
87. See id. § 706(2)(A)-(F). 
88. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
89. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The Supreme Court also 
set outer boundaries on judicial imposition of procedures in federal administration under 
the Vermont Yankee doctrine. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1978) (holding that courts may not layer procedural requirements 
on agencies not speciﬁed in statutes or rules unless constitutionally required or in extremely 
compelling circumstances). 
90. See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (rejecting judicial efforts to impose more onerous procedural 
requirements than required by statute). 
91. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
393, 453 (2015). 
92. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866 (2000) (holding that a Depart-
ment of Transportation airbag safety standard preempted a common law “no airbag” tort 
suit). For a general discussion of administrative procedural trends, see Stewart, supra note 
75, at 441-43. 
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ment across a number of doctrinal areas. These themes recur, but often in quite 
unfamiliar ways, in the local context. 
i i i . local administration: domain, context, and practice 
The arena of local-government administration displays some of the same 
characteristics as the federal paradigm, but there are also crucial differences be-
tween the two contexts.
93
 Local administration involves a vast infrastructure of 
agency action that exists within local governments of all types, from the largest 
cities to the smallest towns. As one scholar has argued, it is in the “uncharted 
continent of administrative practice we might loosely call ‘the individual versus 
the metropolitan bureaucrat’ . . . that the average citizen makes his most fre-
quent contacts with the administrative process.”
94
 Providing a clear picture of 
this uncharted continent presents an empirical challenge. Multiply the vast 
number of local governments—nearly 90,000 such entities, depending on the 
method of counting
95
—by the variety of local agencies, and it is unsurprising 
that there has been so little systematic empirical engagement with local admin-
istration. What Max Pock lamented ﬁfty years ago sadly remains true today: 
“Information upon actual local practices is largely based upon secondary 
sources, since primary data will obviously have to await some future Kinsey re-
port on the behavior of local bureaucracies.”
96
 
Even without that report, however, it is possible to describe in broad-brush 
terms the basic terrain of local agencies. This Part thus begins with a discussion 
of the regulatory domains of local administration and the institutional forms 
through which that administration occurs. It then turns to the varied govern-
mental-structural contexts in which local agencies operate. Finally, it outlines 
aspects of the ﬁne-grained texture of local agency practice. As will become 
clear, the world looks very different when one shifts from the Federal EPA to, 
say, the Dayton Board of Zoning Appeals. 
 
93. Again, for the sake of clarity and parsimony, this contrast elides the complicating intermedi-
ary of the states. 
94. Pock, supra note 11, at 123. 
95. See generally Gov’t Div., Bureau of the Census, 2002 Census of Governments, Volume 1: Gov-
ernment Organization, Number 1: Government Organization, U.S. DEP’T COM. (2002), http://
www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/gc021x1.pdf [http://perma.cc/FD98-KCK7]; State Court 
Sites, ST. & LOC. GOV’T ON NET, http://www.statelocalgov.net/ 50states 
-courts.cfm [http://perma.cc/9AUC-Y9YE]. 
96. Pock, supra note 11, at 124. 
the yale law journal 126:564  2017 
588 
A. The Regulatory Domains and Forms of Local Administration 
1. The Breadth of Local Agency Action 
One signiﬁcant reason for the invisibility of local administration may be a 
long-standing tendency to discount the actual breadth of local regulatory au-
thority and activity.
97
 This view is decidedly mistaken.
98
 While local govern-
ments may not have the full range of power enjoyed by the states and federal 
government, there are a number of policy areas where local governments have 
long exercised signiﬁcant regulatory authority through the auspices of local 
agencies.
99
 A prime example is land use control and the regulation of the built 
environment. Rules in nearly every local jurisdiction set the acceptable terms 
not only of use—residential, commercial, industrial, and the like—but also of 
building height, setbacks, materials, ﬁre protection, energy use, waste treat-
ment, and myriad other minutiae.
100
 Even Houston, which famously lacks a 
 
97. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1059-60 (1980) 
(arguing that “our highly urbanized country has chosen to have powerless cities, and that 
this choice has largely been made through legal doctrine”); id. at 1062-67; cf. David J. Bar-
ron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2267-76 (2003) (describing contempo-
rary views of local authority); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-18 (1990) (acknowledging long-standing tradi-
tional assumptions about local formal powerlessness, but arguing that, functionally, “local 
governments have wielded substantial lawmaking power and undertaken important public 
initiatives”). 
98. See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 484 (2009) (“Cities have always played a more signiﬁcant regulatory 
role than most commentators appreciate, though this role has been muted in the last century 
as federal and state governments have expanded and the great industrial cities have de-
clined.”). 
99. Local agencies also engage in a wide variety of activities that are not regulatory in any mean-
ingful sense, most notably providing services and public beneﬁts. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 116-123. But that is by no means all that they do, and the regulatory functions that 
local agencies undertake remain relatively underexplored. 
100. Local-government land-use regulation in the United States pre-dates the Founding, see John 
F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Signiﬁcance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1252, 1259-81 (1996), and was a feature of local governance throughout the nineteenth 
century, see STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT 
WE OWN 182-85 (2011). Land use became much more prominent a force as an exercise of lo-
cal regulatory authority in the ﬁrst quarter of the twentieth century. See BANNER, supra. 
Starting with Los Angeles in 1908, cities and other local governments across the country 
embraced comprehensive zoning and related regulatory regimes, id., a trend that accelerated 
after the Supreme Court validated the constitutionality of the practice in Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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zoning code, still regulates development through parking and lot size require-
ments, as well as a long-standing subdivision code.
101
 
While much of the basic substance of land use and building law is governed 
directly by local legislation, in many instances, the details of regulatory choices 
are delegated to administrative bodies with interchangeable names such as the 
“Board of Zoning Appeals” or “Board of Adjustment” or the “Planning and 
Zoning Commission” and the like.
102
 These boards can have the authority to 
draft and revise comprehensive plans and, in some jurisdictions, even deter-
mine substantive zoning rules.
103
 In many instances, zoning boards approve 
subdivisions, evaluate what are known as “special permits” or special excep-
tions, and grant variances from the application of the zoning code. This may 
not involve formal rulemaking, but generally does reﬂect the exercise of dele-
gated legislative authority with a great deal of discretion in individual instanc-
es.
104
 
Public health is another arena of signiﬁcant local regulation that is often 
carried out through agencies.
105
 As with land use and the built environment, 
the regulation of public health has been a core municipal function in the United 
States since the earliest cities had to grapple with challenges like cholera, ty-
phus, typhoid, and tuberculosis that spread through densely settled communi-
ties.
106
 Contemporary local governments have developed signiﬁcant regulatory 
 
101. See Michael Lewyn, How Overregulation Creates Sprawl (Even in a City Without Zoning), 50 
WAYNE L. REV. 1171, 1173-89 (2004); Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & 
ECON. 71, 72-76 (1970). 
102. See generally Jerry L. Anderson, Aaron E. Brees & Emily C. Reninger, A Study of American 
Zoning Board Composition and Public Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues, 40 URB. LAW. 689, 691 
(2008) (describing the history of U.S. zoning boards and the results of a study investigating 
whether they “fail to represent a real cross-section of the community”). Although, as with all 
local administration, the nature of the relevant agencies varies across local governments, the 
structure of most zoning boards derives from either the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 
(SSZEA) or the State City Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA), two model ordinances promul-
gated by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the 1920s. Id. at 692-93. 
103. Id. at 693-94 (noting that although in most jurisdictions these commissions serve an adviso-
ry role, in some jurisdictions their rules are binding, as with zoning for local governments in 
Connecticut, or require legislative override to avoid adoption, as in Kentucky or Indiana). 
104. See STEWART E. STERK & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, LAND USE REGULATION 31-44 (2011); see 
also MacLeod, supra note 35, at 57-85 (surveying standards of review in land-use regulation 
and myriad contexts in which delegated authority is exercised). 
105. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1862-66 (detailing the role of delegated regulatory activity in lo-
cal-government public-health efforts). See generally LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH 
LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT (2d ed. 2008) (describing the powers and duties of differ-
ent levels of government with respect to public-health law). 
106. See, e.g., EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO 
1898, at 789-90 (1999); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION 
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infrastructures to address issues such as infectious disease, food-borne illness-
es, health-related environmental conditions, local medical services, and emer-
gency responses.
107
 Structurally, local health departments can be independent 
or operate as part of a state health department, and boards of health oversee the 
overwhelming majority of local health departments.
108
 Most of these local 
agencies serve speciﬁc jurisdictions, although more than a quarter of these local 
agencies operate on a regional basis.
109
 
There are many other areas of local regulation that similarly operate 
through an administrative infrastructure. Local governments have long been 
involved in regulating aspects of the local economy, although they have faced 
signiﬁcant constraints in that exercise given the mobile nature of capital.
110
 Lo-
cal governments—often controversially—set standards for taxis, restaurants, 
contractors, and a variety of other small businesses; again, they do so through 
licensing commissions and other bodies.
111
 The movement to increase the min-
imum wage highlights local regulation of employment conditions, with Seattle, 
for example, recently opting for a phased-in $15 per hour standard.
112
 Local en-
vironmental law is a rapidly expanding and important ﬁeld, as much as we 
 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 204-17 (1996); Edward P. Richards, Public Health Law as 
Administrative Law: Example Lessons, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 61, 64 (2007) (discussing 
the long history of municipal public-health regulation); Richard H. Shryock, The Early 
American Public Health Movement, 27 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 965, 967-70 (1937). 
107. See Eileen Salinsky, Governmental Public Health: An Overview of State and Local Public Health 
Agencies, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y F. 14-16 (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.nhpf.org/library
/background-papers/BP77_GovPublicHealth_08-18-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/K6ED 
-PB52]. 
108. See Justeen K. Hyde & Stephen M. Shortell, The Structure and Organization of Local and State 
Public Health Agencies in the U.S.: A Systematic Review, 12 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S29, S31-
S33 (2012). 
109. See Salinsky, supra note 107, at 10. 
110. See generally Matthew Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Tradi-
tional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 371, 375-82 (2008) (describing local 
regulatory efforts); Schragger, supra note 98 (describing a broad array of local-government 
policies that regulate local economic conditions, including minimum wage, living wage, la-
bor ordinances, as well as anti-chain and anti-big box store zoning). 
111. See, e.g., John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advert. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709 (Mass. 1975); 
Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 36 N.E.3d 632 (N.Y. 2015). 
112. Kirk Johnson, Seattle Approves $15 Minimum Wage, Setting a New Standard for Big Cities,  
N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/us/seattle-approves 
-15-minimum-wage-setting-a-new-standard-for-big-cities.html [http://perma.cc/Q2VZ 
-3FN3]. The Seattle ordinance, for example, provides a complex schedule of minimum wage 
and rate requirements that will be administered and enforced by the city’s Office of Labor 
Standards and Department of Finance and Administrative Services. See SEATTLE, WASH., 
CODE ch. 14.19 §§ 045, 100 (2015); Valerie Hughes & Aurora Janke, Seattle Releases Proposed 
Administrative Rules for $15 Minimum Wage, 22 WASH. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2015). 
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tend to think of environmental regulation through the lens of the EPA.
113
 Con-
sumer welfare has also been a signiﬁcant focus of municipal regulations, even 
drawing targeted preemption efforts at the national level.
114
 And many local 
governments have developed their own civil rights law, at times more protec-
tive than states and the federal government, covering additional protected clas-
ses or expanding available remedies.
115
 These sketches barely begin to exhaust 
the list of the robust direct regulatory apparatus of local governments. 
The provision of public beneﬁts is another important area of local admin-
istration.
116
 Local agencies are deeply involved as the interface between recipi-
ents and the government, whether the actual public beneﬁts are funded locally 
or at the state or federal level. As with the federal Social Security Administra-
tion, a perennial mainstay of administrative law scholarship,
117
 local depart-
ments handle a wide variety of beneﬁts, including welfare, job training, and 
housing.
118
 In all of these areas, there is a body of local administrative practice, 
complete with standards of evidence for beneﬁts, rules on denial, and the rest 
of the panoply of procedural and substantive rules that inevitably govern such 
transfers. 
As increasingly signiﬁcant as local regulation may be, the provision of pub-
lic services has historically been central to local-government identity, more so 
 
113. John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 413-16 (2002). 
114. See Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 770-82 (2007) (exploring local efforts to regulate “predatory lend-
ing” and the conﬂict between them and state and federal preemption); Susan Block-Lieb, 
Consumer Financial Protection, Inclusion, and Education: Connecting the Local to the Global, in 
LAW BETWEEN BUILDINGS: EMERGENT GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN LAW (Nisha Mistry 
& Nestor M. Davidson eds., forthcoming 2017) (discussing the role of cities in consumer ﬁ-
nancial protection). 
115. See Barron, supra note 97, at 2352-57; see also Stacy Laira Lozner, Note, Diffusion of Local Reg-
ulatory Innovations: The San Francisco CEDAW Ordinance and the New York City Human 
Rights Initiative, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 768 (2004) (describing local antidiscrimination ordi-
nances in San Francisco and New York City). 
116. See Diller, supra note 36. 
117. See, e.g., Joseph McGlew-Castañeda, Comment, The Record or the Whole Record?: A Recom-
mendation for the Social Security Administration Regarding the Introduction of New Evidence in 
Review of Disability Claims, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1015 (2013). 
118. See, e.g., Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democra-
cy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 
1563 (2001) (discussing the role of local governments in administering the Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families welfare-to-work program); Gordon Cavanaugh, Public Housing: 
From Archaic to Dynamic to Endangered, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 
228 (2005) (noting the importance of federal-local relationships in the affordable housing 
realm). 
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than at other levels of government.
119
 Education garners nearly forty percent of 
local budgets nationwide, while police and ﬁre protection, utilities, and health 
and hospitals are also signiﬁcant local services.
120
 As with direct regulation and 
public beneﬁts, the infrastructure of local-government service provision often 
operates through agencies and oversight boards.
121
 These include not only the 
boards of education that are the locus of so much controversy within local gov-
ernments,
122
 but also police and ﬁre commissions, boards of water, library 
committees, and countless others.
123
 We may rarely pause to wonder why—and 
what it means—that police officials can be called “Commissioners” (Gotham 
City’s Commissioner Gordon is perhaps the most famous ﬁctional example),
124
 
but, of course, a commissioner implies a commission, which is administra-
tive.
125
 
 
119. See Frug, supra note 13 (noting that local public services may provide a major incentive for 
locating in certain cities). 
120. See TAX FOUND., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 263 tbl.F5 (38th ed. 2004) 
(indicating that thirty-eight percent of municipal spending in 2002 was on education). 
121. In some contexts, like telecommunications, franchise authority is an important source  
of regulatory oversight, see Sylvain, supra note 15, at 828-29, and that authority  
can involve agency action, see, e.g., Local Franchise Authority Contact Information,  
VERIZON, http://www .verizon .com /support/consumer/tv/ﬁostv/annual-notices/local-fran
chise-authority-contact-information [http://perma.cc/6S98-CFNX] (listing local franchise 
authority contacts for customer complaints). 
122. See, e.g., Natalie Gomez-Velez, Urban Public Education Reform: Governance, Accountability, 
Outsourcing, 45 URB. LAW. 51, 69-70 (2013). 
123. The proliferation of local commissions and boards historically was a Progressive Era reform 
response to urban corruption and part of a home-rule movement that privileged the image 
of urban governance as neutral “administration” in contrast to politicized (and often ethni-
cally politicized) local democratic regimes. One strand of the movement for municipal re-
form in the Progressive Era thus sought to insulate local administration from ordinary poli-
tics. This inspired advocacy for city managers as a reform movement, with impetus from the 
National Municipal League, but also to various “good government” internal oversight 
mechanisms. See Barron, supra note 97, at 2291, 2300-09. 
124. See Bill Finger & Bob Kane, The Case of the Chemical Syndicate, DETECTIVE COMICS 27 (May 
1939) (introducing the characters of “Bat-man” and Gotham City’s Commissioner Gordon). 
125. See Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 95 (2016) (“Po-
lice departments are agencies, and as such should have to abide by the same constraints that 
govern other agencies.”); see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note 40, at 1188-89 (discussing the 
authority of the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners over “policies, rules, and regulations 
for the police department,” budget approval, and initial selection of candidates for police 
chief). 
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2. The Ubiquity and Variety of Local Agencies 
If the domains of local administration are broad, so too are the institutional 
forms through which that administration occurs. As with local government 
writ large, there is great variety to local agencies’ form and function.
126
 At the 
federal level, although there is some variation across agency types, there are a 
few primary models. Agencies headed by a secretary or similar unitary head 
(think the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department 
of the Interior, the Department of Commerce, or the Small Business Admin-
istration) and commissions (such as the SEC, the FTC, the FCC, the FEC, etc.) 
describe the majority of federal agencies. It is true that there are relatively large 
federal bureaucracies and some quite small ones,
127
 and much other variation 
in institutional details, but certain basic agency forms cover most of the admin-
istrative law ground at that level. 
The local level, however, yields quite a menagerie of departments, boards, 
bureaus, commissions, and other institutions. Some of these local agencies are 
highly professional, with signiﬁcant staff and recognizable, politically account-
able administrators. Some, however, can resemble community meetings as 
much as they do public agencies, with the locus of gravity on locally appointed 
citizens or residents fulﬁlling a civic duty, but not otherwise formalized in any 
systematic, Weberian bureaucratic sense. To peruse the website of almost any 
local government, large or small, is to encounter this array of internal depart-
ments, partially independent bodies, and largely citizen-staffed commis-
sions.
128
 
 
126. See Jason J. Czarnezki, New York City Rules! Regulatory Models for Environmental and Public 
Health, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1621, 1623-24 (2015) (cataloging a range of speciﬁc local regulatory 
tools such as bans, education, information, infrastructure, standard-setting, mandates, and 
economic disincentives across several policy domains). 
127. The Department of Homeland Security, for example, has nearly 170,000 employees, where-
as the Department of Education manages with a workforce of fewer than four thousand. See 
U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., PPA-02502-6/2016, SIZING UP THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH: FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 7 (2016). 
128. There are, moreover, forms of administration that are distinctly local, or at least largely un-
seen in the federal discourse on administrative law. The inquest is one example. As Paul 
MacMahon recently argued, the inquest is a “quasi-judicial” (administrative) proceeding, 
often used by local governments, under the direction of a coroner, to investigate suspicious 
deaths. See Paul MacMahon, The Inquest and the Virtues of Soft Adjudication, 33 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 275, 276 (2015). Like much local administration, inquests utilize some adjudica-
tive features, but their verdicts are intended to determine facts rather than result in direct 
coercive outcomes. Thus, not only does Las Vegas hold lessons for architecture, see ROBERT 
VENTURI, DENISE SCOTT BROWN & STEVEN IZENOUR, LEARNING FROM LAS VEGAS: THE FOR-
GOTTEN SYMBOLISM OF ARCHITECTURAL FORM (1977), the city (or really Clark County, 
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To provide some concrete examples, beginning at one extreme, New York 
City has some ﬁfty distinct departments with agency heads appointed by the 
Mayor.
129
 Beyond these mayoral departments, there are numerous commis-
sions, committees, boards, and tribunals that exercise signiﬁcant authority—
such as the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), which regulates tens of 
thousands of cabs, commuter vans, limousines, and other vehicles for hire;
130
 
the Campaign Finance Board (CFB), an independent city agency that works on 
election issues;
131
 the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), a federally 
funded local agency that provides housing to hundreds of thousands of resi-
dents; the Conﬂicts of Interest Board (COIB), whose work is reﬂected in its 
name;
132
 and many, many others.
133 
There is always a tendency toward exceptionalism when it comes to New 
York City, but it turns out that the panoply of departments, agencies, and 
commissions that do the work of the Big Apple’s government are not that dis-
similar from many smaller local governments.
134
 The City of Boulder, Colora-
do is a small community that might seem to occupy the opposite end of this 
spectrum. Even Boulder, with population of just under one hundred thou-
 
which houses Las Vegas) has now also produced a legal proceeding lauded for innovation, 
see MacMahon, supra, at 306-09. 
129. In addition to operations that primarily form the internal functioning of the city (like hu-
man resources), these departments address a range of public functions that include envi-
ronmental protection, public health, education, social services, ﬁre, police, and corrections. 
See NYC Organizational Chart, OFF. MAYOR, http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads
/pdf/reports/2014/NYC-Organizational-Chart.pdf [http://perma.cc/QC8A-R3RT]. 
130. The TLC has been involved in its own fair share of regulatory controversy in recent years. 
See, e.g., Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 988 N.Y.S.2d 5 (App. 
Div. 2014) (upholding the TLC’s regulations on the “Taxi of Tomorrow” from challenges 
based on the scope of delegated authority and the separation of powers). 
131. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BOARD, http://www.nyccfb.info [http://perma.cc/DU6L 
-CTED]. 
132. New York City’s COIB is currently chaired by Columbia Law professor—and local-
government scholar—Richard Briffault. See Board Members, N.Y.C. CONFLICTS INT.  
BOARD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/conﬂicts/html/about/board.shtml [http://perma.cc
/9K5N-K7BR]. 
133. On an annual basis, moreover, “the more than 500 administrative law judges (ALJs) in New 
York City’s administrative tribunals hear and decide over a million cases.” David B. Goldin & 
Martha I. Casey, New York City Administrative Tribunals: A Case Study in Opportunity for 
Court Reform, 49 JUDGES’ J. 20, 20 (2010). 
134. Although not directly a survey of local administrative employment, it is telling that as of 
2013, local governments employed just under fourteen million of the nearly twenty-two mil-
lion public employees across the nation, as compared to just under six million state employ-
ees and just under three million federal employees. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G13-ASPEP, 
ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL SUMMARY REPORT: 2013, at 2 (2014). 
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sand,
135
 has an array of local agencies covering the entire range of the city’s ac-
tivities.
136
 The city has numerous core departments and divisions, covering 
everything from human resources and planning to police to licensing, as well as 
boards, authorities, and commissions that cover housing, open space, land use, 
human rights, and other policy areas.
137
 A similar picture emerges of a broad 
swath of local governments, at least those of general jurisdiction.
138
 Miami-
Dade County, a city-county government, has twenty-ﬁve separate departments 
and a number of independent authorities and “trusts” beyond that.
139
 And Par-
ker, Texas, a suburb of Dallas, population 3,600, has fourteen departments and 
three boards and commissions.
140
 In short, most cities, suburbs, and even small 
towns turn to an internal apparatus of agencies to operate, no less so than do 
the states and the federal government.
141
 
B. The Structural Context of Local Administration 
If local administration covers a broad range of policy arenas and institu-
tional forms, a second salient dimension to local administration is that these 
 
135. See Community Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factﬁnder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en
/DEC/10_SF1/GCTPH1.CY10/0500000US08013 [http://perma.cc/3ZJG-RKRB].
 
136. Boulder has a council-manager form of government, with the city manager responsible for 
hiring agency heads. See Government, CITY BOULDER, COLO., http://bouldercolorado.gov
/government [http://perma.cc/T6AY-MA7J]. 
137. Id. 
138. The array of departments, divisions, boards, commissions, and other agencies apply to gen-
eral jurisdiction local governments. As noted infra Section III.B.1, some local agencies are 
independent, functionally and structurally, of their local governments of general jurisdic-
tion. School boards, for example, in some localities are independent entities with no direct 
oversight or control by particular local governments. See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District 
Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 500-01 (2010). 
139. See County Departments, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, http://miamidade.gov/wps/portal/Main
/departments [http://perma.cc/TG33-U4EF]. 
140. See CITY PARKER, http://www.parkertexas.us/ [http://perma.cc/F9MB-VH3X]. 
141. It bears noting that the scale and resources of the relevant local government can be im-
portant in terms of understanding the nature and work of local agencies, although there is 
sufficient variation that it is important not to over-generalize. Agencies in cities such as New 
York, with a current budget of over $82 billion, see Fiscal Year 2017 Expense and Contract 
Budget Resolutions, N.Y.C. COUNCIL (2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads
/pdf/adopt16-expreso.pdf [http://perma.cc/2P9V-54WS], will no doubt have relatively far 
greater resources than agencies in small, suburban communities, but the scale of the prob-
lems facing major cities will tend to be calibrated differently than those facing other local 
governments. Perhaps the more salient distinction, then, is not between larger and smaller 
local governments, but between those in a relatively healthy economic position and those 
cities, such as Detroit and Flint, Michigan, facing persistent economic challenges, regardless 
of scale. 
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agencies operate within local-government structures that are distinct not only 
from their federal government counterpart but also from state government 
structures. Here as well, it is hard to generalize, as there is tremendous institu-
tional diversity at the local level, and local structures can vary dramatically from 
each other. Indeed, government structure gets more complex and divergent the 
lower one goes on the putative federalist hierarchy. Local governments are not 
the smallest matryoshka doll nestled within increasingly larger state and federal 
counterparts, with the classic tripartite structure repeated in miniature. Instead, 
local governments tend to subdivide or combine functions in many ways. 
Relevant local structural distinctions can be cataloged along three dimen-
sions. The ﬁrst two parallel the traditional domain of local-government schol-
arship: the vertical relationship of local governments and their parent states 
(and the federal government) and the horizontal dynamics of how local gov-
ernments interact with each other. The third dimension is less explored in the 
literature, yet is arguably most important for local administrative law: how 
power and structure interact within the bounds of individual jurisdictions. 
1. The Vertical Dimension: The State-Local Relationship 
Local governments have traditionally been viewed as “creatures of the 
state,” with their creation, boundaries, powers, and termination subject to the 
will of the state.
142
 Students of local government know that the landscape of 
local autonomy and oversight is much more complicated.
143
 Most states grant 
 
142. See Briffault, supra note 97, at 6-11. Local governments are generally classiﬁed as municipal 
corporations and quasi-corporations. See 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 1:21 (3d ed. 2010); Laura D. Hermer, Municipal Home Rule in New York: 
Tobacco Control at the Local Level, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 328-30 (1999). Municipal corpora-
tions include cities or other local political entities created by state charter, often voluntarily 
organized by local residents. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 6, 
at 22 (3d ed. 2009). Quasi-corporations such as counties, however, are generally established 
by states to act as administrative agents to serve state needs and interests. Id. § 6, at 20-23. 
Most states have a variety of both municipal and quasi-corporations, and all are structurally 
regulated by state law. 1 MCQUILLIN, supra, § 1:21, at 23. 
143. Formally, states delegate plenary power to local governments through the state constitution, 
statutes, or a combination of both. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 331 (7th ed. 2009). The “Home Rule” 
movement sought to give local governments initiative over local affairs under a general grant 
of authority rather than individualized delegations for speciﬁc purposes and to immunize lo-
cal governance from state interference in certain legislative areas. See FRUG, FORD & BARRON, 
supra note 8, at 167. Frug, Ford, and Barron call these dual—but separate—objectives “Home 
Rule Initiative,” id. at 167-91, and “Home Rule Immunity,” id. at 191-223. 
    Home rule grants were originally referred to as “imperium in imperio,” or a government 
within a government. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra, at 332; see also City of St. Louis v. 
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some version of “home rule” to their local governments, although they do not 
treat all localities equally. Some states provide more power to larger localities, 
for example, than to the smaller ones. Moreover, the types of powers that states 
grant to local bodies varies among states and within states, as does the degree 
of independence granted to local bodies to be free from state interference.
144
 As 
Gerald Frug and David Barron have argued, local authority does not have a 
unitary valence, but rather is a complex mix of empowerment and disability 
ﬂowing from the states.
145
 And courts further shape the degree of protection 
and autonomy offered to local legislative action.
146
 
Turning from local government writ large to the administrative realm, local 
agencies can be relatively independent of state oversight, elected by local resi-
dents, or subject to direct state control. As Paul Diller has noted in the context 
of public health, some local agencies are responsible to multiple principals, 
primarily their local government of general jurisdiction and the state.
147
 Some 
“local” agencies, moreover, are actually state agencies that operate entirely 
within a particular local context, not answerable in any direct democratic way 
to the local government of general jurisdiction.
148
 And, across the range of local 
 
W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893). Local authority has been subject to a rule of 
statutory interpretation still employed that limits local-government power, known as “Dil-
lon’s Rule” after Judge John Dillon’s canonical treatment. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911); see BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra, 
at 314-17; see also Barron, supra note 97, at 2285; Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits 
on Municipal Taxing Authority and What To Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 301-03 
(2016). In reaction to the limitations of Dillon’s Rule, some states moved to a system of leg-
islative home rule, granting local governments presumptive power to act absent speciﬁc state 
legislation. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra, at 333-34; see also City of New Orleans v. Bd. 
of Comm’rs, 640 So. 2d 237, 242-43 (La. 1994). Further complicating this picture of local au-
thority and state control are doctrines of preemption (outright preemption, express preemp-
tion, implied preemption, and ﬁeld preemption) that may justify invalidating certain local 
actions where there are conﬂicts between state and local law. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, su-
pra, at 422-45; FRUG, FORD & BARRON, supra note 8, at 223. 
144. For example, Washington State has created a tiered system of municipalities: “ﬁrst class cit-
ies, second class cities, towns, and code cities”—and “there are some important differences 
with respect to the power and authority of the city government” depending on which class 
the city falls into. ASS’N OF WASH. CITIES & MUN. RESEARCH & SERVS. CTR. OF WASH., 
MAYOR & COUNCILMEMBER HANDBOOK 3, 4 (Oct. 2015). 
145. See generally FRUG & BARRON, supra note 14 (examining the mix of empowerment and legal 
disability across large U.S. cities). 
146. See supra note 143. 
147. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1867-83. 
148. See Aaron Saiger, Local Government as a Choice of Agency Form, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 423 (2016). 
Saiger argues that local governments are themselves a form of state agency. See generally id. 
Saiger’s argument helpfully clariﬁes the state-level perspective on the delegation of state au-
thority and underpinnings of democratic accountability that span elected bodies and admin-
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administration, some agencies have not only local and state principals, but also 
federal involvement, obtaining their authority, funding, and governing rules 
from multiple sources. 
To give a concrete example, consider the nature of public housing authori-
ties (PHAs), entities that provide public housing and administer other housing 
subsidies, such as housing vouchers.
149
 PHAs are typically created by the state 
or at least are established pursuant to state law, but are funded and closely reg-
ulated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Despite 
this federal and state involvement, PHAs are typically constituted within a spe-
ciﬁc local service area and have formal and informal (and, at times, quite 
fraught) relations with their local governments of general jurisdiction.
150
 
PHAs, in short, are agencies operating at the local level that nonetheless have a 
legal identity reﬂecting a mix of federal, state, and local elements. Many other 
local agencies present similar vertical authority variations. Emerging from this, 
then, is an overall picture of authority informed by federalism and state over-
sight but with a certain amount of space for local autonomy and independence 
for particular agencies. 
2. The Horizontal Dimension: Local Fragmentation 
Turning to the horizontal plane, local governments are not only numerical-
ly vast,
151
 but also tremendously varied, divided broadly between local gov-
ernments of general jurisdiction and specialized local governments.
152
 General 
jurisdiction local governments differ in name and powers—from cities and 
 
istrative agencies at the local level, but ignores important distinctions between the nature of 
plenary local governments and more specialized bodies. To view local governments of gen-
eral jurisdiction as indistinguishable from state administrative agencies is to privilege state-
level democratic institutions to the exclusion of local representation. 
149. See Cavanaugh, supra note 118, at 230-33. 
150. PHA Board Members, for example, may be appointed by a mayor or a local legislative body, 
even if PHAs operate quasi-independently of city control. See James Charles Smith, Manag-
ing the Risks of Natural Disasters in Public Housing, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 219, 221 (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds., 2009) 
(“Notwithstanding the lack of a strong tether to state government, PHAs are unavoidably 
members of distinct local communities, necessitating that they forge and maintain relation-
ships with local governments. Thus, each PHA has a long-term contractual relationship 
with the local government within whose boundaries it operates.”). 
151. See Gov’t Div., Bureau of the Census, supra note 95, at v (reporting that in 2002 there were 
more than eighty-seven thousand local-government units in the United States). 
152. See id. 
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counties to towns, villages, and other forms.
153
 Specialized local jurisdictions 
include a wide array of education districts, transit authorities, utility districts, 
and many others.
154
 In the New York metropolitan area, for example, there are 
“31 counties, 783 municipalities and [over a thousand] school, housing, ﬁre and 
other special service districts.”
155
 
Not only are local governments horizontally and functionally fragmented, 
but these fragments can align themselves across formal local (general jurisdic-
tion) boundaries as well. For example, a transit agency or a water district can 
encompass several cities.
156
 Or several fragments also can lie within a single lo-
cal jurisdiction; for example, several school districts can lie within a single 
city.
157
 As a result, citizens can interact with multiple local governments in the 
course of a single day, covering where they work, send their children to school, 
shop, escape for recreation, sleep at night, and more. 
Horizontal fragmentation tends to generate local intergovernmental com-
petition as well as the opportunity for cooperation. Local governments para-
digmatically compete on the interlocal level, for mobile residents in the classic 
 
153. In the United States, there are approximately 3,000 counties or county equivalents; 16,500 
towns or townships; and 20,000 cities. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 143, at 10-12 
(citing Census 2002 and 2007 data). 
154. Nadav Shoked has helpfully added to the standard taxonomy of local forms by identifying 
what he describes as the “quasi-city,” which is an entity that operates as traditional cities do, 
but is technically a special district. See Nadav Shoked, Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971 
(2013). 
155. Part 6: Our Government Institutions Are Failing To Make the Hard Decisions the Region Needs, 
Fragile Success: Taking Stock of the New York Metropolitan Region, REGIONAL PLAN ASS’N (Apr. 
2014), http://fragile-success.rpa.org/c/6.html [http://perma.cc/LD9W-48JD]. 
156. For instance, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) 
directly services most of the county’s eighty-eight cities. See Bus and Rail System,  
L.A. COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSP. AUTHORITY (2016), http://media.metro.net/rid 
ing_metro/maps/images/system_map_2016-0520.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z6KU-5BDB]  
(showing the LACMTA bus and rail line routes); Incorporated Cities, COUNTY  
L.A., http://www.lacounty.gov/government/about-la-county/incorporated-cities [http:// 
perma.cc/W32X-CAW2] (noting that Los Angeles County has eighty-eight cities); see also 
Overview, L.A. COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSP. AUTHORITY, http://www.metro.net/about 
/agency/mission [http://perma.cc/6T54-97QF] (noting that the LACMTA serves nearly 
one-third of the state’s residents). The North Jersey District Water Supply Commission 
likewise provides water to thirteen municipalities. See Contracting Municipalities, N.J.  
DISTRICT WATER SUPPLY COMMISSION, http://www.njdwsc.com/index.aspx?NID=118 
[http://perma.cc/2M5U-RMQ4]. 
157. See generally Saiger, supra note 138 (discussing how periodically redrawing school district 
boundaries could mitigate inequality between nearby school districts within a locality); 
Richard Payerchin, Multiple School Districts Present in Lorain City Limits, MORNING J. (Mar. 
14, 2010, 12:01 A.M.), http://www.morningjournal.com/article/MJ/20100314/NEWS
/303149970 [http://perma.cc/X7M7-YRHH]. 
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Tieboutian sense,
158
 but also for mobile capital,
159
 and, in contemporary con-
ﬂicts over economic development, for the amenities that will attract particular 
types of industries and workers, like the technology sector.
160
 Much of this 
competition is not only local, but increasingly international as well, particularly 
for global cities.
161
 On the other hand, some scholars have emphasized the ob-
verse of this competition, highlighting incentives and structures for interlocal 
cooperation as a counterbalance to the Darwinian view of localism.
162
 Both in-
terlocal competition and the mechanisms of interlocal cooperation are evident 
in—indeed, are often instantiated through—the work of local agencies. These 
dynamics of local fragmentation and mismatching governance scale can gener-
ate regulatory gaps as well as administrative overlap.
163
 
3. The Internal Dimension: Structure Within Local Governments 
A third dimension, most important to the project of understanding the na-
ture of local administration, is the tremendous internal institutional variation 
within local governments. To begin, separation of powers among the executive 
and legislative branches can be lessened, different, or entirely absent in local 
governments.
164
 The prevailing view, at least as a formal matter, is that separa-
 
158. See Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93, 96-102 (2009) 
(summarizing Tieboutian localism as a model predicated on residential mobility). 
159. See Schragger, supra note 98, at 488-506 (arguing that the phenomenon of mobile capital is 
central to the political economy and legal nature of local governance). 
160. See, e.g., Michael Bloomberg, Cities Must Be Cool, Creative and in Control, FIN.  
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.ft.com/content/c09235b6-72ac-11e1-ae73-00144feab49a 
[http://perma.cc/9W44-8FWH] (“I have long believed that talent attracts capital far more 
effectively and consistently than capital attracts talent. The most creative individuals want to 
live in places that protect personal freedoms, prize diversity and offer an abundance of cul-
tural opportunities. A city that wants to attract creators must offer a fertile breeding ground 
for new ideas and innovations.”); see also Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobil-
ity Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 63, 100-02 (2013) (discussing metropolitan 
regional efforts to compete for mobile residents on the basis of local amenities). 
161. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2d ed. 2001) 
(chronicling how cross-border competition and collaboration have been vital to the devel-
opment of global cities). 
162. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 32, at 238-46 (outlining local governments’ incentive to cooper-
ate and the legal structures available to facilitate that cooperation); Clayton P. Gillette, The 
Conditions of Interlocal Competition, 21 J.L. & POL. 365, 367-73 (2005). 
163. Cf. William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and the Challenges 
of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 340-48 (2005) (offering a typology of regulatory frag-
mentation at the regional scale). 
164. Although the Guarantee Clause provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,” the enforcement of the clause has 
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tion-of-powers principles simply do not apply at the local-government level.
165
 
As the Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated, “[S]eparation of powers doc-
trine is a concept foreign to municipal governance.”
166
 Justiﬁcations range from 
the “mere”-ness of local governments, to the idea that checks and balances are 
unnecessary at the local level, to the empirical observation that states have the 
legal-structural latitude to choose not to separate out executive from judicial 
and legislative functions in local governments.
167
 
At the local level, there is a wide variety of executive structures: there may 
be a mayor who is directly elected by residents or, instead, is selected by the city 
council; a mayor sitting on the city council or barred from it; a mayor who can 
or cannot veto legislation; or a city council elected at large or by districts or in a 
mixed manner. Although executive oversight and the “unitary executive” are 
prominent themes in current federal administrative law scholarship,
168
 many 
local governments simply have no elected chief executive officer. It is quite 
common for local governments, for example, to have a legislative branch like a 
city council and to have a “city manager” or another similar official appointed 
by the council as the executive—so-called “council-manager” governments.
169
 
 
been held to be a political question. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of 
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1188 (1999) (cit-
ing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4). Therefore, any separation of powers principles at the state or 
local level derive primarily from state constitutional law. 
    States vary widely in interpreting their separation-of-powers clauses, many limiting 
delegation more strictly than the federal government. Most state constitutions—thirty-ﬁve 
at the last count—“contain a strict separation of powers clause” that “divides power between 
the various branches” and “instructs that one branch is not to exercise the powers of any of 
the others.” Id. at 1190, 1193. Five states have a “general separation of powers clause [that] 
simply divides the powers of government into three branches.” Id. at 1191. Ten have no ex-
plicit provision but the courts infer separation of powers “from the allocation of powers to 
each of the branches of government.” Id. 
165. Separation of powers concerns, despite formal statements to the contrary, inform the juris-
prudence of local administrative law. See Pal, supra note 1, at 810-13. 
166. Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 579 & n.16 (R.I. 2011) (citing a range of cases supporting 
this principle); see also Ghent v. Zoning Comm’n, 600 A.2d 1010, 1012 (Conn. 1991) (“The 
constitutional [separation-of-powers] provision applies to the state and not to municipali-
ties, which are governed by charters and other statutes enacted by the legislature.”); Poynter 
v. Walling, 177 A.2d 641, 645 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962); Tendler v. Thompson, 352 S.E.2d 388, 
388 (Ga. 1987); Willsey v. Newlon, 316 N.E.2d 390, 391 (Ind. 1974); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. 
Padilla, 804 P.2d 1097, 1102 (N.M. 1990). 
167. See Moreau, 15 A.3d 565. 
168. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
169. Jacob Alderdice, Impeding Local Laboratories: Obstacles to Urban Policy Diffusion in Local Gov-
ernment Law, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 466 (2013). A single state can have local govern-
ments with a variety of forms—for example, South Carolina by statute permits a “council” 
form of government, a “mayor-council” form of government, and a “council-manager” form 
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Indeed, one study indicated that versions of the “mayor-council” model with 
an elected executive are much less common than council-manager or similar 
forms that have no formal separation of powers.
170
 Thus for the majority of lo-
cal governments, the executive branch is housed within the legislative branch.
 
Even for local governments with a recognizable chief executive, whether 
mayoral or otherwise, many such chief executives have quite limited, or even 
no, formal appointment and removal power over the heads of administrative 
agencies.
171
 
Legislatively, there is relatively little partisan competition at the local-
government level compared to federal and state bodies,
172
 and legislative re-
sponsiveness to administrative agency action can be swift.
173
 The lack of local 
partisanship is often touted as a decided advantage of local government prag-
matism.
174
 As a result, local agencies often operate in environments in which 
the political economy of oversight is less about partisan proxy battles, as so 
often occurs at the federal level,
175
 and instead is more focused on perennial 
questions of bureaucratic responsiveness and efficiency. Likewise, when agen-
cies act contrary to their delegated authority, the machinery of local legislation 
can react much more quickly than that at the federal level could.
176
 
 
of government. FORMS AND POWERS OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: AN ELECTED  
OFFICIAL’S GUIDE FROM THE MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, MUN. ASSOCIA-
TION S.C. 2 (2012), http://www.masc.sc/SiteCollectionDocuments/Administration/Forms 
%20and%20Powers2.pdf [http://perma.cc/HP4A-FPQV]; see also Alderdice, supra, at 466-
70 (discussing the consequences of variations in local structure). 
170. H. George Frederickson, Gary A. Johnson & Curtis Wood, Type III Cities, in THE FUTURE OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: THE HANSELL SYMPOSIUM (H. George Frederickson 
& John Nalabandian eds., 2002). 
171. See Gillette, supra note 39, at 580-81 (discussing limits on executive authority to appoint and 
remove); Schragger, supra note 39, at 2549 (discussing common limitations on local execu-
tive authority over local agencies). 
172. See generally Schleicher, No Partisan Competition, supra note 41 (analyzing the relatively un-
contested nature of local elections). 
173. See Diller, supra note 11, at 1266-67 (noting that because local legislatures are generally uni-
cameral, overriding executive resistance can be much easier than in bicameral state and fed-
eral legislatures). 
174. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS, 
RISING CITIES 92 (2013); BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLU-
TION: HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 
3-4 (2013). 
175. See generally Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative 
Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849 (2012) (describing the legitimacy problems posed by deference to 
agency decisions based upon political—as opposed to substantive—reasons). 
176. See Diller, supra note 11, at 1266-67. 
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And, peculiarly, the functional distinction between legislative and adminis-
trative entities can blend, particularly in smaller local governments.
177
 Alt-
hough this approach has not been widely adopted across the states as a doctri-
nal matter, at least some courts review individualized determinations by local 
legislative bodies as though the relevant action was actually “quasi-judicial.”
178
 
Functionally, this converts a legislative body into an administrative agency for 
purposes of judicial review.
179
 
Acknowledging all of this rich empirical variety, it is possible to tie a gen-
eral typology of local-government forms to patterns of administrative struc-
ture. Niels Ejersbo and James Svara have usefully mapped the relationship be-
tween local administrators and local political structures,
180
 connecting the main 
forms of local government—such as strong mayor and council-manager—to 
different types of local bureaucracies.
181
 In general, local governments with 
stronger chief executives tend to use agencies less for policy innovation and 
more for traditional functions of administrative implementation, but council-
manager cities tend to place much more extensive independent authority in 
agency policymaking.
182
 
Shifting, ﬁnally, to the structure of accountability, local agencies, unlike 
federal agencies, can have dual oversight by their local governments of general 
jurisdiction as well as by the state. This state-level oversight can come indirect-
ly through the state’s oversight of the local government in which a local agency 
operates or, in some cases, directly from the state in the case of agencies that 
have a local ambit but are not embedded within local governments of general 
jurisdiction.
183
 Not all agencies operating at the local level, however, are ac-
countable to the local governments with which they may share a geographic ju-
risdiction. Some types of “local” governments—notably special-purpose dis-
 
177. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Reliance in Land Use Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 949, 1000-04 (discussing 
the “Fasano” doctrine). For example, in land use, it is common for local legislative bodies to 
make highly individualized determinations about particular parcels, rather than jurisdiction-
wide rules, which has generated judicial concern. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND 
USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 331-61 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing contexts in which 
courts review land-use legislation with relatively greater scrutiny). 
178. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 177. 
179. Id. 
180. See Ejersbo & Svara, supra note 12. 
181. Id. at 157-58. 
182. See id. at 158-59 (discussing the role of chief administrative officers in these forms of gov-
ernment). 
183. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1867-83. 
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tricts—have no direct electoral accountability mechanism at the local level.
184
 
The boards or other governing bodies of many special-purpose authorities are 
often state-appointed, even when their formal jurisdiction is a given locality.
185
 
And some special-purpose entities have no recognizable electoral accountability 
mechanism whatsoever.
186
 
In sum, local governance presents a kaleidoscopic quilt of structural fea-
tures—vertical, horizontal, and internal—many of which have valence for the 
authority and operations of local agencies and deep relevance for a jurispru-
dence of localist administrative law. 
C. The Granular Texture of Local Agency Action 
Finally, moving from the regulatory arena and structural context to opera-
tional details of administration, what might be particularly distinctive about 
how local agencies act on a day-to-day basis, compared to the federal para-
digm? Two elements seem particularly salient in distinguishing local admin-
istration: the relative informality of agency process evident at the local level and 
the permeability of the line between public and private within local agencies.
187
 
1. Formality and Informality in Local Agency Action 
In terms of how local agencies operate, it is clear that there is a tremendous 
range of formality and informality. As a legal matter, the latitude granted to lo-
cal agencies to design and institute their own procedures varies widely. Schol-
ars have long explored the variance between the federal APA—the statute that 
 
184. Conversely, at the local level, as with many states, direct democracy can play a role in re-
sponding to administrative agency work in a way that is unknown to federal administrative 
law. See infra Section III.C.2. If one long-standing legitimacy concern in administrative law 
scholarship has been the inability of the political process to respond to principle-agency 
problems between legislative direction and executive implementation, then (for better or 
worse) initiatives and referenda may be an alternative means of oversight. 
185. See Lisa M. Card, One Person, No Vote? A Participatory Analysis of Voting Rights in Special Pur-
pose Districts, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 57, 59 (2004); Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDS 
To Pin Down the Truth About Special Districts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3050 (2007). 
186. See George W. Liebmann, The New American Local Government, 34 URB. LAW. 93, 112 (2002) 
(noting that “[m]ost special districts have appointive boards or boards designated by partic-
ipating local governments”). 
187. It bears acknowledging again here that in many areas of local authority—and hence local 
administration—there tend to be some mix of purely local institutions, state institutions that 
operate at the local level, and hybrid state-local entities. See supra Section III.B. For the sake 
of simplicity, this Section focuses primarily on purely local administrative entities, but I will 
return below to some variations that play out with other forms of local agency. 
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sets the basic parameters of federal administrative action, however broadly
188
—
and the myriad state APAs.
189
 But at least state APAs provide a modicum of 
uniformity at the state level, with the state APA applying directly to the work of 
local-government agencies in some states, at least in some circumstances.
190
 
Many local agencies, however, operate without any similar mandatory 
overarching legislative procedural guidance. In nearly half the states, local 
agencies do not fall within the ambit of the relevant state APA.
191
 Some states 
 
188. See generally Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 
IND. L.J. 1207 (2015) (describing agency and judicial interpretations and implementations of 
the APA). 
189. Cf. Rossi, supra note 6 (discussing empirical knowledge about state APAs). 
190. States that apply their state APAs to local-government agencies, at least in some circum-
stances, include Hawaii, see Bush v. Haw. Homes Comm’n, 870 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Haw. 1994); 
Maryland, see Donocam Assocs. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 489 A.2d 26, 30 (Md. 
1985); North Dakota, see Falcon v. Williams Cty. Soc. Serv. Bd., 430 N.W.2d 569, 571 (N.D. 
1988); Oregon, see City of Wood Vill. v. Portland Metro. Area Local Gov’t Boundary 
Comm’n, 609 P.2d 379, 381 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); South Carolina, see Brown v. James, 697 
S.E.2d 604, 608-09 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010); Tennessee, see Hoback v. City of Chattanooga, 
No. E2011-00484-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2974762, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2012); Vir-
ginia, see Conner v. Commonwealth, No. 0380-08-1, 2008 WL 2964365, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. 
Aug. 5, 2008); Wisconsin, see Citizens for Sensible Zoning, Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 280 
N.W.2d 702, 706 (Wis. 1979); and Wyoming, see Sheridan Planning Ass’n v. Bd. of Sheri-
dan Cty. Comm’rs, 924 P.2d 988, 990 (Wyo. 1996). 
191. These include Alabama, see U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Coop. Dist. of Spanish Fort, No. 11-
0401-WS-M, 2011 WL 3810266, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 2011); Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-1001 (2014); California, see Allen v. Humboldt Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 34 
Cal. Rptr. 232, 235 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Connecticut, see Edwards v. Code Enf’t Comm., 
534 A.2d 617, 620 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10102 
(2002); Florida, see Young v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 625 So. 2d 831, 837 (Fla. 1993) (Barkett, 
C.J., concurring); Georgia, see LaFave v. City of Atlanta, 373 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Ga. 1988); Ida-
ho, see Gibson v. Ada Cty. Sheriff ’s Dep’t, 72 P.3d 845, 847 (Idaho 2003); Illinois, see Bethune 
v. Larson, 544 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Iowa, see Bogue v. Ames Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 368 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 1985); Louisiana, see Hayden v. New Orleans Baton 
Rouge S.S. Pilots Fee Comm’n, 707 So. 2d 3, 9-10 (La. 1998); Massachusetts, see United 
Food Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 376 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass. 1978); 
Minnesota, see Cty. of Hennepin v. Civil Rights Comm’n of Minneapolis, 355 N.W.2d 458, 
460 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Mississippi, see Watkins v. Miss. Bd. of Bar Admissions, 659 So. 
2d 561, 572 (Miss. 1995); Missouri, see State ex rel. Young v. City of St. Charles, 977 S.W.2d 
503, 504-05 (Mo. 1998); Montana, see N. 93 Neighbors, Inc. v. Bd. Cty. Comm’rs, 137 P.3d 
557, 563 (Mont. 2006); New Jersey, see Tibbs v. Bd. of Educ. of Township of Franklin, 276 
A.2d 165, 170 n.1 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1971); New Mexico, see Mayer v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Bd., 463 
P.2d 40, 41 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970); New York, see 1777 Penﬁeld Rd. Corp. v. Morrison-Vega, 
498 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 (App. Div. 1986); North Carolina, see Cunningham v. Catawba Cty., 
493 S.E.2d 82, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); South Dakota, see Armstrong v. Turner Cty. Bd. of 
Adjustment, 772 N.W.2d 643, 652 (S.D. 2009); Utah, see Davis Cty. v. Clearﬁeld City, 756 
P.2d 704, 706-07 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Vermont, see In re Maple Tree Place, 594 A.2d 404, 
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and local governments have speciﬁc statutes that similarly create general proce-
dural obligations speciﬁcally for local governments.
192
 That leaves a tremen-
dous range of procedural discretion at the local level as a baseline matter.
193
 
Another aspect of informality in local administration is the reality that 
much of the work of local agencies is carried out by front-line officials who ex-
ercise signiﬁcant discretion in daily contact with local residents.
194
 Michael 
Lipsky famously described this as “street-level bureaucracy,”
195
 with police 
officers, teachers, social workers, and other local service providers exercising 
signiﬁcant delegated authority to implement policy.
196
 Much more so than at 
the federal level, then, the daily work of local administration is embodied in a 
distributed web of officials interacting directly with the public. 
Given the frequent lack of clear structural requirements akin to an over-
arching APA framework—at least for some local agencies—and the signiﬁcant 
discretion possessed by so many front-line agents, procedural due process has 
been a particular legal concern in local administration. This has been especially 
(but by no means only) true in the context of administrative adjudication, but 
 
406 (Vt. 1991); and West Virginia, see Sw. Cmty. Action Council, Inc. v. Huntington Hu-
man Relations Comm’n, 371 S.E.2d 70, 72 (W. Va. 1988). 
    In some states, ostensibly local agencies with state-wide responsibility are covered by 
their state APAs. See, e.g., Fisher v. Hous. Auth. of Omaha, 334 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Neb. 
1983). And state legislatures are free to single out speciﬁc agencies for inclusion by statute in 
the coverage of a state APA, which occasionally happens. See, e.g., Morgan v. Comm. on 
Beneﬁts, 894 P.2d 378, 382-83 (Nev. 1995). 
192. See, e.g., Action All. of Senior Citizens of Greater Phila., Inc. v. Phila. Gas Comm’n, 6 Pa. D. 
& C.3d 144, 149 (1977) (“Adopted in late 1968, the Local Agency Law is the counterpart at 
the municipal level to the Administrative Agency Law . . . .”). 
193. Of course, even the federal APA has left a broad range of procedural discretion to agencies 
since its inception, and courts have continued an older tradition of developing administra-
tive common law within—and beyond—the APA’s broad categories. See John F. Duffy, Ad-
ministrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 130-38 (1998); see also 
Magill, supra note 64 (discussing the discretion federal agencies have to choose policymak-
ing procedural frameworks). 
194. Like federal and state officials, local officials engage in a wide variety of tasks that do not di-
rectly implicate administrative law, such as agency management and the ministerial imple-
mentation of programs. But the line between implementation or management and admin-
istration can be indistinct, and acts that appear to be routine can embody signiﬁcant 
discretion. See Diller, supra note 11; see also Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Po-
litical Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014) (arguing for 
the application of administrative law principles to law enforcement). 
195. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC 
SERVICES (2010). 
196. Id.; see also Steven Maynard-Moody & Shannon Portillo, Street-Level Bureaucracy Theory, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 252 (Robert F. Durant ed., 2010). 
localist administrative law 
607 
is an issue in individualized determinations more broadly.
197
 One of the most 
iconic cases in the so-called due process revolution, Goldberg v. Kelly,
198
 in-
volved the procedures for distributing welfare promulgated by the New York 
City Department of Social Services.
199
 This constitutional response was, at 
least in part, a reaction to the lack of clear statutory or administrative common-
law procedures at the local level. This lack of clarity is not unique to local ad-
ministration by any means, but resonant at that level nonetheless. 
2. The Local Permeability of Public and Private 
A second distinction for local administration is the relative permeability of 
the line between public and private in the work of many agencies. This perme-
ability echoes, at a micro-institutional level, tension over the question whether 
local government as a whole should be considered purely public or should con-
tinue to reﬂect aspects of the private corporation that was the predecessor of 
many types of local governments.
200
 This conceptual divide was evident, for 
example, in early attempts by the Supreme Court to deﬁne a realm of tradition-
al governmental functions for purposes of Tenth Amendment immunity from 
federal regulation for local governments, an endeavor the Court eventually 
abandoned as too difficult.
201
 But it has also emerged in a variety of other, more 
prosaic contexts in which municipal actions are contested and the scope of local 
sovereignty is at issue.
202
 This is hardly surprising, given that one strain of the 
 
197. See Michael Asimow, Due Process in Beverly Hills 90210: Separation of Functions in Local Gov-
ernment, 28 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2003, at 27; see also Londoner v. Denver, 210 
U.S. 373 (1908). 
198. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
199. Id. at 258-60. 
200. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 38-
45 (1999); see also HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPO-
RATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983). 
201. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling Nat’l League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
202. This public/private tension has long been an undercurrent in the jurisprudence of local au-
thority and identity, and remains contested in a number of doctrinal areas implicating mu-
nicipal law. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Realigning the Governmental/Proprietary Distinction in Mu-
nicipal Law, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 173, 181-203 (discussing confusion over the 
governmental/proprietary distinction in controversies over “legislative grants of municipal 
authority, government contracts, torts, eminent domain, adverse possession, zoning, and 
governmental tax exemptions”); see also Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Es-
caping from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1990). 
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historical origins of local-government identity in the United States was corpo-
rate.
203
 
For local agencies, this public/private divide plays out over two dimen-
sions: the privatization of local functions as well as the infusion of private ac-
tors in the work of public agencies. To begin, the contracting out of services 
has long been a controversial but common feature of local-government opera-
tion.
204
 Privatization generally involves services more than agencies focused on 
regulatory or licensing activities,
205
 but there are some local functions that 
shade into more traditional administration. These can include, for example, en-
forcement in areas such as tax arrears and child support, as well as the devel-
opment of regulations, as is common in some areas of land use, even if those 
regulations are subsequently publicly adopted.
206
 
Even where functions have not been entirely privatized, many local agencies 
have structural and functional involvement with both private parties and with 
the public at large, more so than most federal agencies. For example, many lo-
cal commissioners or board members are local residents who act as part-time 
appointees.
207
 Zoning board members might serve a few nights a month at the 
same time that they are also maintaining a real estate business; school board 
members might have children in the school district, but otherwise have no pro-
fessional involvement in education; police review commissions are often staffed 
by prominent civilians from the community; other examples abound.
208
 
 
203. See FRUG, supra note 200 (recounting the history of ambiguities over the public/private di-
vide in U.S. local governments). 
204. See, e.g., Konno v. Cty. of Haw., 937 P.2d 397, 400, 410 (Haw. 1997) (voiding a contract be-
tween the county and a private landﬁll company on state constitutional grounds). See gener-
ally GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 
(1981) (describing so-called “Lakewood Plan” cities that contract for minimal services). 
205. Prominent areas include police and ﬁre safety, transportation, and human resource func-
tions. See George A. Boyne, Bureaucratic Theory Meets Reality: Public Choice and Service Con-
tracting in U.S. Local Government, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 474, 478-79 (1998). 
206. In land use and building codes, for example, smaller and less resourced local governments 
often adopt off-the-shelf private codes. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Land Use for Energy Conser-
vation and Sustainable Development: A New Path Toward Climate Change Mitigation, 27 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 295, 304 (2012) (explaining that “[m]ost states and municipalities that 
adopt energy codes” use a private code promulgated by an international-standards organiza-
tion). 
207. See, e.g., Kristin Knudsen Latta, The Role of Non-Lawyers on Administrative Tribunals: What 
Lay Members Think About Law, Lawyers, and Their Own Participation in Alaska’s Mixed Admin-
istrative Tribunals, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 37 (2014). 
208. That this is a common feature of many local agencies is evident in the ethics concerns that 
potential conﬂicts of interest in local governance perennially raise. See Patricia E. Salkin, 
Crime Doesn’t Pay and Neither Do Conﬂicts of Interest in Land Use Decisionmaking, 40 URB. 
LAW. 561 (2008). 
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While many local administrative entities, like community boards, involve 
the participation of ordinary people, many local agencies that do not have that 
formal involvement are still quite close to day-to-day life and often involve res-
ident input in direct ways.
209
 Local citizens testify actively at (or have formally 
recognized authority in) school boards, zoning reviews, police commissions, 
and the like. And administrative processes at the local level at times formally 
require consultation with or involvement by neighborhood-level committees or 
boards.
210
 All of this brings community perspectives directly into administra-
tion. This is not to argue that local bureaucracies are inherently responsive to 
local concerns.
211
 As anyone who has ever applied for a building permit knows, 
local agencies can be distant, bureaucratic, and insulated. But, as a structural 
matter, the interface between public and private in local administration can be 
decidedly porous. 
*** 
Taking a step back, then, this empirical overview highlights some distinc-
tive aspects of local administration, recognizing the often-unheralded breadth 
of local regulatory, adjudicatory, and enforcement activity. Local agencies exist 
in a variety of governmental-structural contexts that can vary signiﬁcantly from 
the federal paradigm. Likewise, the relative informality of many local agencies 
can be troubling by creating space for inequity without a baseline or ﬁrm 
standard, as well as by risking divergence in the exercise of discretion. Howev-
er, this informality can also hold beneﬁts for local residents by fostering more 
direct input into administration. And the perennial ambiguity about the pub-
lic/private divide in local governance opens channels for responsiveness while 
creating concerns about expertise, corruption, and parochialism. All of this 
must be accounted for both in administrative jurisprudence and in the scholar-
ly discourse, to which we turn in the next two parts. 
 
209. Another variation on the public role in local governance arises from instances in which local 
governments grant community members formal roles such as veto power over certain devel-
opment rights. These “neighbor consent” provisions generated a jurisprudential muddle go-
ing back to the era before zoning was widespread, see Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. 
v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chi., 242 U.S. 526 (1917); 
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912), and direct community decision making 
remains a fact in some localities. 
210. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323 (2014) (describing sub-local institu-
tions down to the neighborhood level); see also Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Struc-
tures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 508 (1997) (examining innovations in sub-
local institutions such as “enterprise zones, tax increment ﬁnance districts, special zoning 
districts, and business improvement districts” that “provide for a variety of territorially 
based differences in taxation, services, or regulation within individual cities”). 
211. Although local agencies may hold some promise in that regard. See infra Section V.A. 
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iv. localist administrative law 
Administrative law broadly covers a variety of legal questions, including 
agency authority and structure, procedural requirements for administration, 
the basic validity of agency decisions, and judicial review.
212
 Even as adminis-
trative law scholarship has fruitfully begun to focus on agency activity outside 
the litigation context,
213
 judicial review of a variety of agency actions, from 
statutory interpretation to substantive policymaking to procedural regularity, 
remains a focal point of the literature. Accordingly, this Part homes in on a ju-
risprudential framework for judicial review of local agency action, although the 
insights are relevant to the more general corpus of administrative law.
214
 
A localist jurisprudence of judicial review would elevate and render more 
transparent four themes, even as it continued to address more generic ques-
tions endemic across administrative law.
215
 First, it would grapple substantively 
with the distinctive nature of the local governmental structure at issue. It 
would likewise seek to bolster procedural regularity where appropriate, but 
recognize that informality may have a place to play in local administration. It 
would also be transparent about anxieties that private involvement raises in lo-
cal administration, where relevant. And it would take a nuanced approach to 
administrative expertise in this context. This Part works through these factors 
to limn a broad formalist and functionalist framework for courts to craft a 
transsubstantive local administrative law. 
To illustrate how these factors would inﬂuence doctrine, the Part then gives 
two speciﬁc examples. First, on the question of the appropriate level of defer-
ence when courts review local statutory interpretation or substantive policy-
making, the recent New York City soda portion case illustrates where local-
government structure and local agency expertise should have taken a more 
prominent role. Likewise, the nondelegation doctrine at the local level takes on 
 
212. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, 
TEXT, AND CASES 2 (7th ed. 2011). 
213. See Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 
259 (2015); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1448 (2010); Stack, supra note 51. 
214. See infra Section V.C. 
215. It is worth noting that state courts that review local agency actions are, in practice, a mix of 
state and “local” courts. As Ethan Leib has explored, although state court systems are nomi-
nally uniﬁed, some state judges associate their work more with the local rather than with the 
state. See Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 902, 907 
(2013) (exploring how “local courts as instrumentalities of local governments” approach 
statutory interpretation distinctly from federal or state courts and explaining the ways in 
which a judge may be “localist”); see also Annie Decker, A Theory of Local Common Law, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1939, 1956-66 (2014) (arguing for a theory of distinctly “local” courts). 
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a new hue in light of local administration—with an example drawn from 
among the many in agency interpretation of land-use statutory standards—
highlighting the idiosyncrasy of the surprisingly robust application of the doc-
trine at the local level. 
A. A Jurisprudence for Judicial Review of Local Agency Action 
As challenging as it is to generalize about the practice and context of local 
agency work,
216
 it is equally difficult to coalesce the current jurisprudence of 
local administrative law across the many domains in which it arises—
regulatory, adjudicatory, enforcement, licensing, and otherwise. By contrast, 
whatever variations are evident in the body of law that has emerged from the 
judicial review of federal administration, that jurisprudence at least begins with 
common constitutional, statutory, and institutional underpinnings.
217
 
That said, as with the empirics of local administration, it is possible to dis-
cern some themes in the case law as a point of departure, to the extent that 
courts even treat local agencies as distinctive.
218
 As courts review local agency 
action, for example, it would be fair to note an undertone of skepticism in some 
of the case law,
219
 as much as courts do at times evince respect for the work of 
agencies.
220
 This could reﬂect concerns about bureaucracy undermining de-
 
216. See supra Part III. 
217. See supra Section II.A. 
218. Some of the case law involving local agencies simply proceeds as though the level of gov-
ernment is immaterial, see, e.g., Cty. of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 723 
N.E.2d 256 (Ill. 1999), and this may be appropriate in some circumstances. This Section ar-
gues that there are important elements of local practice that may bear out in the case law. 
This is not to argue that more general questions of administrative legitimacy shared by the 
judicial review of an agency at any level of government, in terms of rationality, process, and 
the like, are not equally relevant. Rather it is to argue that, in addition to this baseline of le-
gitimacy, there is value in interrogating what might be distinctive about a particularly local 
context. 
219. See, e.g., Bullitt Fiscal Court v. Bullitt Cty. Bd. of Health, 434 S.W.3d 29, 38 (Ky. 2014) (de-
clining to defer to a county public-health agency’s interpretation of its governing statute); 
Schulmann Realty Grp. v. Hazlet Twp. Rent Control Bd., 675 A.2d 645, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1996) (declining to defer to a rent control board because “the interpretation of an 
ordinance constitutes a purely legal matter for which an administrative agency has no par-
ticular skill superior to a trial court”); Langer v. Raymond, 699 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (App. Div. 
1999) (Mercure, J., dissenting) (“Although a zoning board’s construction of the governing 
zoning ordinance is generally to be afforded ‘great weight and judicial deference,’ no such 
deference is required where the question is one of pure legal interpretation.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
220. There are many contexts in which courts currently accord deference or at least weight to lo-
cal agency expertise or substantive judgment. See, e.g., Bontrager Auto Serv., Inc. v. Iowa 
City Bd. of Adjustment, 748 N.W.2d 483, 490-97 (Iowa 2008) (deferring to a local agency 
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mocracy, skepticism about the capacity and expertise of local agencies, the 
fraught nature of local parochialism, and the perils of overly strong private in-
volvement in local governance, or even the risk of corruption (as an extreme 
version of administrative capture). In some contexts, skepticism may well be 
warranted, and in others, it will be more appropriate for courts to accord re-
spect to the work of local agencies. Regardless, courts should be explicit when 
that skepticism inﬂuences doctrine and when instead deference is due. In doing 
so, they should be transparent about what is distinctive about the nature of the 
speciﬁc local agency at issue.
221
 
This Section provides some guideposts for that more explicit judicial en-
gagement with structure, process, democratic legitimacy, and local expertise. 
To be clear, this framework for a transsubstantive local administrative jurispru-
dence is not meant to be an argument for a uniform body of law. The point is to 
surface and clarify what is distinctive about local administration, rather than to 
simplify the judicial task. This Section accordingly outlines four particularly 
salient factors that courts should consider. 
1. Recognizing the Implications of Local Structure 
If the overriding reality of local administration is one of institutional plural-
ism,
222
 some aspects of local structure can have a direct bearing on how courts 
should approach local administrative law. For example, assumptions about ex-
ecutive oversight inform a number of aspects of the judicial review of agency 
action. If courts use that oversight as a ground for deference, they should inter-
rogate the actual structure of any given local government. Where there is a 
clear line of authority from a recognizable local chief executive, processes of 
democratic accountability can serve as a reasonable, if imperfect, undergirding 
for authority delegated to local agencies.
223
 But the absence of direct electoral 
 
on the question of impairment of neighborhood property values); Somers Assocs., Inc. v. 
Gloucester Twp., 575 A.2d 20, 30-31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (deferring to an ad-
ministrative interpretation of an ambiguous ordinance). 
221. Transparency is, itself, a contested value in governance, despite the prominence of sunlight 
rationales. See Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 
617, 624-32 (2010). The argument here is for a speciﬁc kind of transparency: courts should 
explicitly and self-consciously acknowledge the project of local administrative law and artic-
ulate the practical and normative assumptions that might inform its doctrines. It is admit-
tedly aspirational that that kind of transparency might help courts and scholars reﬁne the ju-
risprudence once it is acknowledged. 
222. See supra Section III.B. 
223. One irony about local politics is that mayors and other local executives tend to bear the 
blame for actions taken by local administrators over whom they have no formal or function-
al control. The alignment of accountability and control was a primary argument that former 
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feedback if there is no mayor or similar executive with accountability for agen-
cy action may suggest that some agencies deserve greater judicial scrutiny. 
To complicate matters further, the fact that some local agencies have a dual 
structure of oversight—from the local government of general jurisdiction and 
from the state
224
—might mitigate judicial concerns about faithless agency. Such 
dual delegation can mean that the work of local agencies is scrutinized and held 
accountable by multiple principals. In this way, perhaps ironically, the very lim-
itations of local power inherent in state oversight can be an institutional reason 
for judicial minimalism. 
Similarly, the functional combination of executive and legislative branches 
in a single body in many local governments—the absence of formal separation 
of powers—can change how courts evaluate delegation. If an executive agency 
is really just a part of a uniﬁed local-governmental structure, then concerns 
about the clarity of legislative direction may take on a different cast, with am-
biguous delegations subject to more immediate legislative oversight. Indeed, 
local legislative bodies (city councils, county boards, and the like) can be di-
rectly engaged with the work of the agencies that are part of their hierarchies. 
And local legislative bodies may exercise both legislative and administrative 
functions, which can inform how courts approach the administrative side of 
that functional equation.
225
 
There are potentially as many variations to these kinds of structural com-
plications as there are local governments.
226
 The point here is relatively simple: 
 
Mayor Bloomberg made in seeking oversight of the New York City Panel for Educational 
Policy (formerly the Board of Education). See Robert Kolker, Mr. Ed, N.Y. MAG. (May 3, 
2004), http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/crimelaw/columns/classaction/n_10284/ [http://
perma.cc/5MFP-8NE7]. 
224. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1868-77. 
225. In Anderson v. Peden, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court, in upholding a county 
board’s exercise of discretion, noted that the board had both legislative and administrative 
roles, reasoning that the exercise of administrative discretion was thus not without political 
accountability. 587 P.2d 59, 66 (Or. 1978) (en banc). 
226. In the soda portion cap case, for example, a group of local government and administrative 
law professors argued that the differences between New York City and New York State mili-
tated against the application of state-level separation-of-powers and nondelegation doctrine 
in this context. See Brief for Paul A. Diller et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents-
Appellants at 6, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014) (APL 2013-00291) (“Even assuming 
arguendo that Boreali remains good law at the state level, there is no reason why Boreali 
ought to apply, ipso facto, to local agencies.”). The argument was echoed by the dissent in 
the case. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 16 N.E.3d at 558 (Read, 
J., dissenting) (“To my knowledge, before today we have never applied the Boreali separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine outside the context of state legislative delegations to state agencies 
under the state constitution.”). 
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courts should resist false parallels to higher levels of government, where struc-
tural realities may be very different.
227
 Instead, courts should be clear where 
norms of administrative legitimacy require formal or functional predicates and 
then test those assumptions against the actual structures in place. As they do, 
litigants will begin to craft their arguments accordingly, and a more sophisti-
cated and clearer jurisprudence of local internal structure will emerge. 
2. Calibrating Procedural Regularity 
A second foundation for a localist administrative law would involve cali-
brating deference around the procedural realities of local agencies. As discussed 
above, the level of formality that attaches to local-government agency action 
can vary signiﬁcantly, and the institutional constraints that deﬁne that process 
are likewise quite diverse.
228
 Local agencies have been criticized both for being 
so informal as to lack “law” altogether,
229
 and, conversely, as being too rigid 
and formalistic, applying a set of standards and rules without deviation.
230
 At 
both ends of the normative spectrum, local agencies are seen to lack the capaci-
ty for nuance or, worse, to be unable to make reasoned and considered judg-
ments in the ﬁrst place. 
These critiques may have real purchase in some local contexts, and clearly 
procedural due process has an important role to play as a ﬂoor in administra-
tive adjudicatory contexts and similar individualized determinations.
231
 But the 
critique and the variability suggest, perhaps obviously, that reviewing courts 
 
227. In grappling with local structure, there are actually two false equivalences that courts should 
avoid. The ﬁrst, as discussed above, is the risk of too quickly equating the familiar institu-
tional structures of federal administrative agencies with a local government structure that 
can vary signiﬁcantly. The second and subtler elision is to fail to disaggregate the local from 
the state. This is conceptually challenging, given the prevalence of the creature-of-the-state 
view of local governments, even in states with strong home rule. But state norms around 
separation of powers and executive oversight can be just as inappropriate to apply to local 
governments as federal norms. 
228. See supra Section III.C. 
229. New York City administrative courts, for example, have been praised for their “informality” 
and “ﬂexibility,” which in turn are seen as assisting “self-represented parties.” Goldin & Ca-
sey, supra note 133, at 27; cf., e.g., Gissel v. Sehdeva, 413 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (La. Ct. App. 1982) 
(noting the “informality of city court procedure”); Bosley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 135 
P.2d 479, 480 (Okla. 1943) (observing that the state legislature and courts have protected the 
more liberal pleading rules in city courts and for justices of peace). 
230. Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1385, 1385 (1992) (“[I]nformal rulemaking . . . has not evolved into the ﬂexible and efficient 
process that its early supporters originally envisioned. During the last ﬁfteen years the rule-
making process has become increasingly rigid and burdensome.”). 
231. See supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text. 
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should pay particular attention to the care and procedural depth with which an 
agency has approached the work at issue. This reﬂects the suggestion from the 
Supreme Court, in United States v. Mead Corp.,
232
 that one potentially im-
portant tool to calibrate the level of deference due to a federal agency is the lev-
el of formality with which an agency chooses to act.
233
 
Mead involved a challenge to a letter issued by the United States Customs 
Service that changed the classiﬁcation of import duties on the company’s fa-
mous day planners.
234
 In ﬁnding that the Customs Service’s letter rulings were 
not entitled to Chevron deference,
235
 the Court emphasized that an agency 
stands a better chance of getting either binding deference, or even the less 
binding respect accorded under Skidmore deference,
236
 the more the agency ac-
tion at issue followed procedural formality.
237
 Thus formality would echo Con-
gress’s conferral of delegated authority and the agency’s choice to exercise that 
authority.
238
 The more casual an agency pronouncement, the less likely the 
agency is to be taking action carrying the force of law and, thus, less deserving 
of deference.
239
 
Technical formality in the Mead sense is not a perfect proxy for thorough 
process, thoughtfulness, or any other indicia of legitimacy in administrative 
work. And predicates for strong deference at the federal level, such as an explic-
it or implicit legislative choice to rest lawmaking authority in an agency, or 
greater relevant technical knowledge, may be lacking in many local-
government contexts. However, abstracting away from the speciﬁc federal con-
text in which Mead arose, there is much to the proposition that the more seri-
ously an agency at any level of government signals that it has undertaken its 
administrative task, the more a court should give credence to the result. This is 
a matter of logic, on one level; but there is a formal aspect to this criterion for 
deference bounded in the legitimation that can derive from notice, comment, 
and other indicia of traditional administrative formalism.
240
 
 
232. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
233. Id. at 236. 
234. Id. at 221. 
235. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
236. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
237. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. A reviewing court invoking a Mead-like calibration of process for deference would have to 
take into account the particularly procedural requirements that bind any given local agency, 
whether from a state APA, a more speciﬁc procedural statute, or even the absence of clear 
guidance. See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text. 
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That said, there may be some situations in which the work of local admin-
istration may be consistent with norms of considered judgment despite the ab-
sence of the kind of formality typically accorded at the federal level when agen-
cies seek deference.
241
 Where local agencies are functioning more to aggregate 
and channel local input, rather than solely to reach internal, independent policy 
conclusions, that information-aggregation process may involve informal con-
sultation or community engagement. This can arise, for example, with some 
land-use planning, as well as in education and other contexts that break down 
more familiar conceptions of agency process as notice, input, and reﬂection at a 
distance.
242
 That is not to excuse resource or similar institutional constraints, 
but rather to scale what can be expected of local agencies in terms of formality. 
The due process revolution has been an important part of the individual 
adjudicatory aspect of local administration,
243
 but the argument here is for a 
broader calibration of procedural regularity and judicial deference throughout 
the work of local administration. As with governmental-structural argu-
ments,
244
 increased transparency from courts explicitly calibrating deference to 
procedural normality will generate more litigation arguments, and could there-
fore improve agencies’ procedural practices in the ﬁrst place.
245
 
 
241. This is relevant primarily outside of the administrative adjudicatory context. Cf. Cass, supra 
note 6, at 367-70 (describing the “bipolar model” of administrative decision making, which 
distinguishes between process due in adjudications and process due in quasi-legislative 
rulemakings). 
242. At the federal level, the rise of negotiated rulemaking provides echoes of procedural process-
es that challenge the paradigm of agency call and response removed from more direct in-
volvement of regulated entities. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the 
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (offering “a normative vision of collabora-
tive governance against which to evaluate proposals for reform” of the ossiﬁed rulemaking 
process). 
243. See generally Diller, supra note 36, at 1188-93 (discussing how individual hearings and their 
due process protections relate to administrative accountability). 
244. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
245. This feedback loop may generally lead local agencies to adopt more formal procedures across 
the board, and local agencies will have to resist moving too far toward ossiﬁcation and away 
from what is most beneﬁcial about embeddedness in the community. Where informality can 
be beneﬁcial—for example, in reﬂecting community voice—that process may nonetheless le-
gitimate the resulting agency action. A similar argument can be made for the value of local 
knowledge in the expertise with which courts might credit local agencies. See infra Section 
IV.A.4. Procedural formality that fosters predictability and consistency on the one hand and 
fulsome input on the other may stand in tension, with citizens more removed from agency 
work the more bureaucratized that work becomes. In responding to a jurisprudence that en-
courages formality, agencies will have to be careful to manage this tension. 
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3. Accommodating Public/Private Ambiguities 
The jurisprudence of local-government law reﬂects historical tensions over 
the nature of local governments as partially public and partially private enti-
ties.
246
 As discussed above, there are two aspects of the public/private ambigui-
ty in local governance that are particularly relevant to the judicial review of lo-
cal agency action. The ﬁrst is privatization: many local-government services are 
provided by private parties. The second is the reality that for many recogniza-
bly public agencies, the line is more permeable in many contexts than is evident 
in the world of federal administration.
247
 
As courts review local agency action, there is a decided undercurrent of 
concern evident about private involvement in local public administration.
248
 
This is reﬂected in questions about the legitimacy of, and ethical dilemmas 
posed by, citizen involvement with local agencies. It also likely informs the rela-
tive absence of deference for many of the more localist administrative struc-
tures in areas such as zoning and public education. This skepticism may be ap-
propriate or it may be overdrawn, but it is rarely acknowledged explicitly.
249
 
Any assumptions that courts make about the legitimacy of citizen involve-
ment, or even about the relative risk of local corruption compared to other lev-
els of government, should not be implicit. Courts policing the somewhat more 
porous lines between local government and public involvement in the work of 
that level of government should, at a minimum, acknowledge that public in-
volvement carries beneﬁts as well as causes for concern, with appropriate pro-
cedural and ethical safeguards. The argument here, then, is again primarily one 
for intentionality in accommodating, where appropriate, the reality of the in-
volvement of the public as private individuals in so much agency work. 
4. Reconceptualizing Local Expertise 
All of this leads, ﬁnally, to the functionalist question of the nature of local 
agency expertise. Again recognizing the difficulty of generalizing, it is fair to 
say that some courts tend to denigrate—or outright dismiss—the expertise of 
local administrative bodies, in contrast to the prevailing norms evident in the 
 
246. See supra Section III.C.2. 
247. See supra Section III.C.2. 
248. See MacLeod, supra note 35, at 69 (noting that in the local land-use regulatory context, re-
viewing courts “seem worried” that regulators “are acting to promote primarily private in-
terests rather than promoting the common good of the community”); Salkin, supra note 208 
(discussing conﬂicts of interest in land-use decision making). 
249. See MacLeod, supra note 35, at 68-69 (noting that in the land-use context, “courts seldom 
explain why they are employing” a particular standard of review). 
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judicial review of federal agencies.
250
 This judicial skepticism is bound up with 
an overly narrow view of what that expertise entails. 
Local administrative expertise should be understood, more so than at other 
levels of government, in dual terms. Certainly, for some local agencies, exper-
tise involves the traditional, technical knowledge that federal agencies are 
thought to have.
251
 This is not always the case, of course, as many local agen-
cies have limited resources and lack the independent ability to develop sophis-
ticated technical knowledge. But expert knowledge can be found at the local-
government level. 
Courts should also understand, however, that local agencies may play a 
very different role than their federal counterparts—a more explicitly mediating 
and information-collecting function. As Carol Rose has argued in the context 
of land-use regulation, one way to understand the role of local governance is as 
channeling and mediating individual disputes.
252
 In this mode, local institu-
tions serve to aggregate local information—about local conditions and the local 
implications of policy—and ensure that intensely personal preferences are con-
sidered in the process.
253
 
To be sure, the infusion of public involvement and the diffusion of local au-
thority in agency functioning may make local agencies seem more haphazard in 
their work. It also exposes local agencies to the critique that they are too close 
to the people they serve, undermining their impartiality in ways that may be 
absent in the federal agency context. But their role as information aggregators 
may also give these agencies access to locally grounded information and a kind 
of on-the-street accountability that is hard to replicate in federal administrative 
law.
254
 
 
250. See, e.g., In re Baker v. Vill. of Elmsford, 70 A.D.3d 181 (N.Y. 2009); D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-
Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 773 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio 2002); Entm’t Indus. Coal. v. Tacoma-Piece 
Cty. Health Dep’t, 105 P.3d 985 (Wash. 2005) (en banc); see also Pal, supra note 1, at 816-17 
(discussing expertise in the context of challenges to local public-health policy). 
251. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1892-95 (discussing public health as an arena of “Wilsonian” tech-
nical expertise that combines empirical grounding with the “science” of public administra-
tion). 
252. See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legit-
imacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 887-93 (1983) (arguing for a mediation model to describe pro-
ceedings for piecemeal changes in local land use). 
253. Id. at 910 (arguing that “the test of due consideration should be based on popular participa-
tion in the steps of a mediation process”). 
254. Scale matters here, as elsewhere in local administration. See supra Section III.B. In large cit-
ies, like New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, the ability to mediate local preferences may be 
less immediate than in smaller communities where the boundaries between agency officials 
and the community may be more permeable. Even in major urban areas, however, some 
agencies—in areas such as land use and education—can work through neighborhood-level 
localist administrative law 
619 
This function reﬂects what may be most attractive about the expertise of lo-
cal government in an experimentalist mode. It is also potentially democracy 
enhancing to the extent that local agencies take seriously the role they can play 
in engaging residents and citizens in issues of local governance.
255
 And it brings 
to bear a localist legitimacy that is distinct from the technical knowledge gener-
ally associated with administrative agencies. Zoning panels and school boards 
may be staffed by realtors and parents, but that can be an important—and val-
id—perspective on the kinds of local policy questions with which the adminis-
trative city-state often grapples.
256
 
B. Two Doctrinal Examples 
To prove valuable, the framework just laid out should have doctrinal pur-
chase. To illustrate, this Section traces the framework through two of the most 
common doctrinal touchstones in administrative jurisprudence. First, the level 
of deference accorded to substantive review of an agency’s policy choices is a 
perennial question that can illustrate, for example, the implications of local-
government structure and the distinctive nature of local expertise. Second, the 
nondelegation doctrine as it applies to local agencies is an area of doctrine that 
can highlight concerns over the private role in local governance and relative in-
formality. It would be difficult to link cleanly individual features of the frame-
work with a precise jurisprudential taxonomy—given the sheer diversity of lo-
cal agencies and institutional contexts in which they operate, the lack of a tight 
hermetic link is hardly surprising. Applying the framework to elevate what is 
 
institutions such as community boards and advisory neighborhood councils, belying larger-
scale implications. 
255. As with the parallel to Mead, in evaluating the accountability that can arise from community 
involvement, the weight that the Supreme Court gave to the public planning process in Kelo 
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), is in some ways analogous. There, one critical 
factor the Court relied on in considering the legitimacy of the exercise of eminent domain 
for economic development was the quality and extensiveness of the predicate planning exer-
cise. See id. at 484-85. 
256. One could argue that the elected or even “local” nature of many courts reviewing local agen-
cy action might be a ground for less deference to the local knowledge evident in much local 
administration, to the extent that such courts may have local knowledge and can be account-
able. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1237-54 (2012) (laying out arguments for why the interpretive meth-
ods of elected judiciaries should diverge from unelected judiciaries given accountability and 
competence considerations). However, even if reviewing courts have some accountability, 
they do not possess the procedural tools to readily seek out and aggregate relevant infor-
mation beyond the case or controversy before them, nor are they repeat players who can ad-
just as information changes. For these reasons, as between the expertise of local agencies and 
the knowledge base of local courts, there are good reasons to prefer the former. 
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distinctive about local administration is intended rather to start a process of 
identifying where the core themes can illuminate a path for courts to follow. 
1. Deference and Substantive Review—Localist Chevron and Skidmore 
Judicial review often turns on the reasonableness or rationality of agency 
action (or the substantiality of the evidence supporting it), whether in inter-
preting ambiguous statutes or making substantive policy. The threshold ques-
tion is generally what level of deference courts owe to the relevant agency.
257
 As 
scholars have explored, the landscape of deference in state administrative law is 
much more varied than the relatively uniform paradigm that the Supreme 
Court has crafted at the federal level.
258
 Local administrative law evinces a pat-
tern that appears similarly varied, although part of the challenge in mapping 
standards for the review of local agencies is the relative absence of any self-
conscious acknowledgement of the necessity of articulating localist-sensitive 
deference norms.
259
 
The framework laid out above, however, can guide courts as they calibrate 
the appropriate level of deference in reviewing statutory interpretation and 
substantive policy choices by local agencies. Take, for example, the New York 
Court of Appeals’ decision in the soda-portion-cap case that opened this Arti-
cle.
260
 The Court of Appeals took an essentially disdainful approach to defer-
ence, raising a number of problems. To begin, the court’s majority opinion 
barely considered what distinguishes New York City’s governmental structure 
and complex local apparatus of separation of powers from state legislative over-
 
257. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1153-72 (2012) (arguing for a distinction be-
tween the exercise of delegated authority and traditional weight given to agency views). 
Moreover, although reasonableness or rationality review—or, indeed, even binding defer-
ence for agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes under the second step of Chevron—
seems to evince great variety in terms of articulated standards and details, there is a strong 
argument that the exercise tends to converge. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. 
L. REV. 135, 137 (2010) (“Amid all the chaff of standard of review doctrine, the wheat lies in 
the reasonableness of the agency’s action. In fact, the ‘reasonable agency’ standard is, in-
creasingly clearly, the standard that courts actually apply to all exercises of judicial review of 
administrative action, no matter what standard they purport to use.”). 
258. See Pappas, supra note 6, at 984 (“A survey of the ﬁfty states’ equivalents to the Chevron doc-
trine shows an array of different announced standards, ranging from strong deference to an 
agency interpretation to completely de novo review explicitly discouraging deference.”); see 
also sources cited supra notes 6, 67. 
259. Cf. Leib, supra note 215, at 920-22 (describing the lack of uniformity with which state courts 
apply federal law); MacLeod, supra note 35, at 72-75 (surveying the widespread confusion 
across states about the standard for deference in the local land-use regulatory context). 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
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sight. The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene was 
overseen by a mayor who was deeply immersed in the details of what he 
viewed as one of his signature policy concerns. The Department also exercised 
delegated authority not only from the city, but also directly from the State of 
New York. One argument the city made in defending the Department of 
Health’s proposed regulation was that the legislation establishing the agency 
provided a source of legislative authority that was independent from, and in 
addition to, whatever delegation had been made under the city’s Charter.
261
 
The court rejected the argument with relatively little discussion, as though this 
structural proposition was somehow unfathomable.
262
 It may have been an 
overreach by the agency, but it was not an entirely unreasonable position, and 
the court did not give it the consideration it deserved. 
The Court of Appeals likewise denigrated the Department of Health’s clear 
technical expertise and unique understanding of patterns of urban health.
263
 
Here, one need not even reach the question of how locally grounded the De-
partment is to recognize that even the federal government at times follows the 
lead of local public-health agencies like the Department.
264
 But that expertise is 
all the more salient, given that public-health agencies have unique insights into 
how health issues like obesity actually unfold on the ground. None of that ex-
pertise—technical or experiential—gained recognition by the Court of Appeals. 
Ultimately, then, the court delegitimated what should have been a relatively 
banal exercise of regulatory discretion. A body of administrative law jurispru-
dence even minimally sensitive to local context would suggest that some level 
of deference was warranted in this case—if not some local equivalent to Chev-
ron, then at least the respect reﬂected in Skidmore deference. Local authority ex-
ercised through the Department of Health—no less than the EPA or OSHA or 
any federal agency—should have stood. 
This is but one example of how a framework of judicial deference sensitive 
to local context on grounds such as structure and expertise might play out 
differently. In this case, that structure should have yielded greater deference, 
but that will not always be the case. It might seem ironic that, after spilling so 
much ink about the distinctive nature of local administration, this example 
supports the adoption of a model of deference that resembles federal approach-
es. However, the outcome does not turn on the aptness of the analogy to feder-
 
261. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 544 (N.Y. 2014). 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 543. 
264. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1866-67 (noting federal adoption of public-health innovations 
from the local level). 
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al agency action, but rather on a clear engagement with the distinctive nature of 
this particular local agency.
265
 
2. Nondelegation in the Shadow of Local Practice 
This Article’s doctrinal framework also illuminates an intriguing puzzle that 
emerges from the current jurisprudence of local administrative law. At the fed-
eral level, it is black-letter law that the nondelegation doctrine has essentially 
no strength as a meaningful ground of judicial oversight.
266
 In the mid-1930s, 
the Supreme Court decided a pair of nondelegation cases, one involving public 
delegation,
267
 and one involving delegation to private parties.
268
 After those 
cases, the Court essentially got out of the business of policing nondelegation at 
the federal level.
269
 
At the local level, however, nondelegation is still a vibrant doctrine, with 
signiﬁcant application.
270
 Nondelegation was one issue in the New York City 
soda-portion-cap case,
271
 but state courts generally use nondelegation princi-
ples to rein in zoning boards, health departments, and similar entities. Land 
use is a particularly fertile context. For example, in Kosalka v. Town of 
Georgetown,
272
 the Maine Supreme Court heard a challenge to the denial of a 
conditional use permit by the town’s Board of Zoning Appeals, an administra-
 
265. That an approach more sensitive to the structure, authority, and expertise of the Department 
of Health would have yielded an outcome perhaps closer to the paradigm federal appellate 
review of federal agencies might have been a consequence, but only because the Court of 
Appeals’ approach in the case was so nondeferential in the ﬁrst place. 
266. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78; cf. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Over-
sight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 183, 203-04 (2013) (noting the breadth of congressional delegation). 
267. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
268. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
269. There have been nondelegation claims—both public and private—made to the Court in the 
decades since Schechter and Carter Coal, but they have failed. See Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (citing Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 
607, 646 (1980) (plurality opinion)); see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. 
Ct. 1225 (2015) (sidestepping a private nondelegation claim by ﬁnding Amtrak to be a gov-
ernmental entity for purposes of a challenge to its role in jointly developing rules for pas-
senger railroad services with the Federal Railroad Administration). 
270. This parallels the treatment of nondelegation observed by Jim Rossi and others at the state 
level: many states explicitly or functionally adopt a stronger form of nondelegation doctrine 
than do federal courts. See Rossi, supra note 164, at 1193-95; see also Gary J. Greco, Standards 
or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 578-
80 (1994). 
271. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 549 (N.Y. 2014). 
272. 752 A.2d 183 (Me. 2000). 
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tive body. The Board’s duties included ensuring that conditional uses must 
“conserve natural beauty,”
273
 a standard that most likely would have passed 
muster at the federal level.
274
 To the Maine court, however, this standard pro-
vided insufficient guidance, and it was struck down as an unconstitutional del-
egation from the town to the board.
275
 Such decisions are fairly common.
276 
What accounts for this particular disconnect between local and federal ad-
ministrative law? It is hard to say for certain, but the relative informality of lo-
cal boards seems to play a role.
277
 An even more trenchant explanation may be 
the permeability of public and private at the local level. Delegating to a zoning 
board—ostensibly a public agency but often governed, if not entirely staffed, by 
part-time volunteers
278
—seems to raise judicial anxiety about authority being 
given to local residents.
279
 Legislative standards that might be acceptable when 
given to a deeply resourced, professionally staffed traditional agency may be-
come more troubling when community members are tasked with the decision 
making. The strength of the nondelegation doctrine at the local level likewise 
 
273. Id. at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
274. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (upholding a delegation to EPA 
based on the word “requisite”). 
275. Kosalka, 752 A.2d at 187. 
276. See Josh Eagle, The Practical Effects of Delegation: Agencies and the Zoning of Public Lands and 
Seas, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 836-37 n.3 (2008) (noting the strictness with which courts have 
approached the delegation of authority to zoning boards, both as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation and under various state constitutional theories, such as due process, equal protec-
tion, and separation of powers). 
277. It is thus common for judicial review of the output of local agencies to highlight questions of 
the relevant record and the substantiality of the evidence. See, e.g., Grant’s Farm Assocs. Inc. 
v. Town of Kittery, 554 A.2d 799, 801-03 (Me. 1989) (approving the board’s decision because 
it was supported by substantial evidence). 
278. See supra text accompanying notes 207-208. 
279. See, e.g., Marta v. Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608, 610 & n.3 (Del. 1968) (invalidating a local ordi-
nance “purport[ing] to delegate to neighboring residents an uncontrolled and undeﬁned 
power to impose a zoning restriction and to limit the use of the property of another,” and 
noting that the ordinance’s “evil . . . is accentuated by granting the controlling zoning voice 
to neighboring residents rather than, as is usual in consent ordinances, to neighboring prop-
erty owners. Residents would include transients, boarders, visitors, and summer-time ten-
ants.”); see also GEORGE W. LIEBMANN, THE GALLOWS IN THE GROVE: CIVIL SOCIETY IN AMER-
ICAN LAW 55-57 (1997) (noting that state court hostility to zoning delegations rests on the 
seemingly private nature of the relevant delegation). 
    At the federal level, courts have maintained a clear conceptual distinction between pub-
lic nondelegation (delegation by Congress to agencies) and private nondelegation (delega-
tion to private entities to exercise regulatory authority). Technically, cases involving zoning 
boards and the like are public nondelegation cases, but the argument here is that the con-
cerns animating private nondelegation may be inﬂuencing judicial review in this context. 
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may be understood to ﬁlter concerns about capture through the experience of 
local corruption. 
In judicial review of local agency action, these concerns about the ambigui-
ty of the public/private line may be entirely warranted, but there are also rea-
sons to consider whether they are overstated. This is not to say that police 
oversight commissions staffed by local citizens or community review boards led 
by neighborhood activists should raise no concerns about legitimacy. Rather it 
is that nondelegation should reﬂect the advantages as well as the risks that 
public involvement, knowledge, and accountability bring to local agencies. Lo-
cal administrative nondelegation should not be the same empty doctrine it is at 
the federal level, by any means. But courts should be more explicit about why 
they are skeptical and whether that skepticism is necessarily warranted. 
*** 
In practice, there are going to be norms of judicial oversight that are com-
mon across all levels of government, including basic notice and the opportunity 
to be heard, the building of a record, and the obligation for rational explana-
tion, among other core values at the heart of any legitimate administrative pro-
cess. But important differences in the details can emerge at the local level. What 
Thomas Merrill has described as the “appellate review model”
 280
 of judicial 
oversight serves an important legitimating function that will have parallels for 
federal, state, and local agencies. If there is, then, a spectrum of uniformity and 
particularity across these levels of government, the framework above somewhat 
artiﬁcially highlights distinctive aspects of local administrative context and 
practice, so that, over time, courts can develop a jurisprudence that is sensitive 
to that distinctiveness where appropriate.
 
v. the lacunae revisited 
In the end, framing a distinctly localist administrative jurisprudence leads 
back to the value that an exploration of local institutions offers more broadly 
for legal scholars and the interdisciplinary discourse of local governance.
281
 For 
local-government scholars, foregrounding administration can add a rich di-
mension to the literature on local authority and identity, complicating ques-
tions of local democratic accountability, the valence of local community, and 
the institutions of local experimentalism. Similarly, for administrative law 
scholarship, giving local agencies their rightful place can provide new institu-
tional contexts that denaturalize the overly federal focus of extant literature. 
 
280. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review 
Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939 (2011). 
281. See supra Part I. 
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This holds promise for an administrative law that reﬂects all levels of govern-
ment in our federal system. This Part reviews these implications and then sets 
out a scholarly agenda moving forward. 
A. Administration in the Discourse of Localism 
The traditional discourse on localism pivots on a central tension between 
the beneﬁts and costs of devolution and decentralization. In only slightly re-
ductionist terms, proponents of local legal authority and autonomy emphasize 
the potential of local governments to reinforce democratic participation and el-
evate community.
282
 Localism, proponents further argue, also tends to lead to 
more efficient public services, both because local officials can better respond to 
local preferences,
283
 and because governance is disciplined through local resi-
dents exercising their right to “exit” through mobility.
284
 And a third general 
beneﬁt associated with empowering local governments is the ability of devolu-
tion and decentralization to advance experimentalism.
285
 If the ﬁfty laborato-
ries of democracy are beneﬁcial in federalism, the argument goes, surely ninety 
thousand must provide even more fertile ground for variation, tinkering, and 
policy diffusion. 
The familiar obverse of these arguments focuses instead on the dark side of 
local authority and autonomy. Thus, local governments, scholars frequently 
 
282. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 97, at 1069 (arguing for the importance of local governance to de-
mocracy as popular involvement); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—
Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20-21 (2010) (presenting the 
role of minority rule in federalism “in shaping identity, promoting democracy, and diffusing 
power” (footnotes omitted)); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) 
Need a Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2031-33 (2000) (reviewing 
GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 
(1999)) (discussing the potential threat that regionalism poses to the democratic advantages 
of smaller government). 
283. Saiger, supra note 158, at 96-102 (describing the argument for localism from allocative effi-
ciency). 
284. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991); see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGU-
LATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 289-324 (1995). 
285. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Con-
temporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1312, 1334-35 (1994) (isolating the local gov-
ernment role in dynamics of experimentalism). See generally Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemp-
tion, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113 (2007) (surveying the landscape of state preemption of local 
authority); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998) (identifying and supporting a shift toward democratic 
experimentalism, “in which power is decentralized, enabling citizens and other actors to uti-
lize their local knowledge to ﬁt solutions to their individual circumstances”). 
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note, tend to be exclusionary and parochial, undermining the representational 
interests of those not immediately participating within the boundaries of local 
democracy.
286
 Moreover, smaller jurisdictions tend to generate spillover effects 
not internalized at the local level.
287
 And experimentalism can undermine uni-
formity.
288
 These are very well-rehearsed arguments, to say the least, but we 
can look at them afresh through the lens of local administration. 
1. New Variables for Democracy, Community, and Parochialism 
The basic discourse on localism tends to treat “local government” as a uni-
ﬁed entity with recourse to electoral politics as the primary mechanism of dem-
ocratic accountability. Refracted through the practice of local administration, 
however, basic questions of community, participation, and exclusion provide 
both new sources of concern—grounded in the ubiquity of local bureaucracy—
as well as potential new grounds for optimism. 
As to bureaucracy undermining accountability, the concern is clear that the 
more robust the “administrative state” within any local government, the more 
Kafkaesque the potential experience of the ordinary citizen. As proverbially 
hard as it is to “ﬁght city hall,”
289
 it is that much more challenging to contend 
with dozens of local agencies. On the other hand, the fact that the public can be 
so involved in local agency process can provide new avenues of participation 
and accountability.
290
 Depending on the details of local political participation 
and the salience of any given agency’s domain,
291
 it may be difficult to hold 
 
286. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371 (2001). For a 
general argument that local governments pose a particularly sharp risk of the failure of Mad-
isonian majoritarianism given their small scale, see CLINT BOLICK, LEVIATHAN: THE 
GROWTH OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE EROSION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
287. See, e.g., Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?: Sharing the Beneﬁts and Burdens 
of Suburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV. 659 (1997). 
288. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 787, 831 (2008); cf. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experi-
mentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 78-80 (2011) (discussing tradeoffs be-
tween experimentalism and uniformity). 
289. See Kenneth W. Starr, Leviathan: The Federal Republic and the Challenge to Freedom, 90 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1639, 1649 (2005) (reviewing BOLICK,supra note 286) (discussing the long-
standing truism that “you can’t ﬁght city hall”). 
290. See Pradeep Chandra Kathi & Terry L. Cooper, Democratizing the Administrative State: Con-
necting Neighborhood Councils and City Agencies, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 559 (2005); cf. Bress-
man, supra note 56, at 469-92 (critiquing majoritarian models of administrative oversight). 
291. The empirics on electoral politics at the local level are less robust than at the state and feder-
al level, but there is evidence to suggest generally lower voter turnout. Compare, e.g., Neal 
Caren, Big City, Big Turnout? Electoral Participation in American Cities, 29 J. URB. AFF. 31, 42 
(2007) (reporting an average voter participation rate of twenty-seven percent in thirty-eight 
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mayors, city council members, and other local elected officials directly account-
able for administrative actions. But the centrality of electoral accountability 
may be tempered by the very blurring of governmental action and public par-
ticipation in local governance that has traditionally troubled courts, with a vari-
ety of alternative means to give voice down to the neighborhood level to citizen 
concerns.
292 
Another important lesson that administrative practice may hold for the dis-
course on localism is the possibility for political participation by outsiders to 
local government. If the accountability grounding for concerns about parochi-
alism is predicated on the reality that non-citizens are disabled from participat-
ing in local democracy, administrative process may supply at least a partial 
remedy. The fact that administrative agencies have broader mechanisms than 
simply voting may actually temper concerns about lack of representation 
(“voice” in the classic triad of exit, voice, and loyalty
293
). No outsider to the 
polity is necessarily entitled to any kind of political representation and general-
ly does not have the right vote in local elections, with only limited excep-
tions.
294
 However, if a regulated entity can build a case before an administrative 
agency, that entity may get a different hearing than if it tried to navigate the 
shoals of local politics unﬁltered through norms and relatively transparent pro-
cesses of administration. Given perennial concerns about bureaucracy under-
mining democracy, it may be an ironic consequence of the breadth of local ad-
ministration that it can create a space for policy engagement beyond the 
boundaries of any local government. 
2. Experimentalism Refracted Through Administration 
As to experimentalism, the limited geographic scope of local agency ac-
tion—as with localism more generally—might suggest more latitude for inno-
vation. When OSHA or the EPA sets a national rule for an industry, that rule 
binds the nation, but when a city or county tries (and perhaps fails) to innovate 
in the regulatory arena, the consequences by deﬁnition are, well, localized. 
 
large U.S. city mayoral elections), with The United States Election Project, National General 
Election VEP Turnout Rates, 1789-Present, ELECTPROJECT.ORG, http://www 
.electproject.org/national-1789-present [http://perma.cc/W3WV-MS4Y] (showing federal 
election turnout rates in recent off-year elections in the mid-thirty to low forty percent range 
and as high as over sixty percent in recent presidential cycles). 
292. See generally Shoked, supra note 210 (discussing sub-local participation dynamics). 
293. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, OR-
GANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
294. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 385-89, 396-401 (discussing the general territoriality of the 
local franchise and cases in which state law has extended the franchise to nonresidents, for 
example nonresident property owners and taxpayers). 
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Moreover, when the federal government regulates, there is no functional ability 
to exit for a regulated entity—short of international migration, of course—or 
other similar check on the scope of federal administrative reach. But with local 
agencies, there is the additional discipline of exit. This may factor more or less 
heavily in some regulatory arenas, depending on the relative mobility of any 
individual or entity, but it is a potentially signiﬁcant difference in terms of the 
latitude that states and courts might give local agencies to innovate in areas of 
policy uncertainty. 
The limited geographic scope of local agencies also cabins the experimental 
exercise. This is partially just a question of scale, and the same can be said for 
other sub-local institutions, like business improvement districts and neighbor-
hood advisory councils.
295
 But scale here is more complex, given that some lo-
cal agencies have authority that is coterminous in its geographic scope with the 
relevant local government of general jurisdiction, but others have a narrower or 
even a broader (at times regional) ﬁeld of operations.
296
 
Functionally, adding administrative agencies to accounts of local experi-
mentalism adds important texture to our understanding of how policy varia-
tion and diffusion actually occurs. Joseph Landau has argued that lower-level 
agency actors play an unappreciated role in fostering policy innovation at the 
federal level, having the latitude within the bounds of administrative discretion 
to offer higher-level officials new ideas and policy options.
297
 At the local level, 
particularly in areas such as public health,
298
 a similar dynamic plays out, with 
a robust infrastructure of local interagency dialogue. Indeed, interlocal cooper-
ation more generally is often facilitated by agency-level interaction, which may 
be a way to overcome parochial resistance to the loss of policy autonomy that 
can occur at the level of general jurisdictional leadership.
299
 All of this multi-
 
295. See Briffault, supra note 210 (exploring the range of sub-local institutions); Christopher 
Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in its Place: Affordable Housing and 
Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667 (2013) (arguing for multiple scales in con-
sidering dynamics of local exclusion); Shoked, supra note 210 (discussing the “micro-local” 
level of governance). 
296. See supra Section III.B.2. 
297. See generally Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and Immigration 
Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173 (2016) (canvassing delegation and agency discretion in the immigra-
tion context and arguing that experimentation and creativity by frontline immigration offic-
ers can positively inﬂuence overall executive action). 
298. See Diller, supra note 11. 
299. Agency collaboration has been a theme in the new governance literature, although the litera-
ture has not focused on local agencies per se. See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The 
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
342 (2004) (contrasting a regulatory model of agency that promotes adversarial relations, 
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plies the promise of local experimentalism while cabining the practical conse-
quences of policy failure. 
B. The Place of the Local in Administrative Law 
If administrative agency practice and norms provide a new lens to consider 
debates about localism, local practice can have equal relevance to scholars who 
focus primarily on federal administrative law. Adding the local to the discourse 
enables a kind of institutional complexity that can usefully throw core concerns 
of administrative law into relief. On the other hand, continuity as well as 
difference—especially continuity that pushes, in Heather Gerken’s phrase, “all 
the way down”
300
—can be instructive for administrative law scholars. Baseline 
norms in administrative law can be understood not only to transcend particular 
substantive domains, but likewise to pertain to all levels of government.
301
 
1. Embracing Institutional Variety 
As we have seen, familiar tropes of legitimacy and legality that deﬁne ad-
ministrative law at the federal level can look decidedly different in the context 
of local administration.
302
 The absence of separation of powers, the lack of a 
unitary executive, the reality of actual independence from the relevant local 
government for some agencies, and other institutional variations explored 
above—structural and legislative—suggest that there may be alternative ways 
to achieve the goals associated with administrative law beyond the conceptual 
toolkit now present at the federal level. So, too, do the mechanisms of account-
ability that have developed at the local-government level that emphasize public 
participation and the immediacy of citizen input, to cite another variation. 
This raises a challenge, then, for scholars of administrative law: to what ex-
tent are the speciﬁc mechanisms of legitimacy that set most of the boundaries 
of the discourse at the federal level necessary or even sufficient? If there are al-
ternatives, do they suggest more ﬂexibility at the federal level? At a minimum, 
scholars of administrative law should pay more attention to municipal and oth-
er local bureaucracies. They tend to be the part of the overall administrative 
state that most people encounter most often in their day-to-day lives. But more 
 
mutual distrust, and conﬂict, with a governance model in which non-hierarchical horizontal 
relationships help promote mutual interdependence, accountability, and compromise). 
300. Gerken, supra note 282, at 4. 
301. Disaggregating local governments from the states can also carry beneﬁts for scholars of state 
administrative law, for similar reasons. 
302. See supra Section II.B. 
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importantly, core theoretical concerns can take on a very different cast with the 
menagerie of local agencies. 
To give one example, take concerns over administrative capture.
303
 Agencies 
are thought to be vulnerable to an overly close relationship with the entities 
they regulate, and, at the extreme, this can lead to outright corruption. Local-
ism can cut in multiple ways in outlining a more complex picture of this dy-
namic. At the local level, exit or even the desire for entrance (local attempts to 
attract industries, for example) can give greater leverage to many regulated in-
dustries in conﬂicts with local regulators, which might lead to greater risk of 
capture. And there is also a perennial problem of some regulated entities (alt-
hough by no means all) possessing greater relative power than local regulators. 
On the other hand, the particular types of accountability mechanisms that can 
be a distinctive feature of local administration, such as public participation and 
the political economy of relatively intense local preferences,
304
 may bolster the 
ability of local regulators to resist capture by outside regulated entities. 
Local accountability can give rise more generally to parochialism, another 
obvious concern for local administration. Given the limited geographical scope 
of local governments and local political economy, local agencies might treat 
outsiders in a less favorable manner than insiders. On the other hand, the 
communitarian strain of localism suggests one ground on which capture might 
be resisted, with local involvement potentially insulating agencies from devel-
oping too close a relationship with regulated entities. This pattern may be evi-
dent, for example, in recent controversies over “broadband localism.”
305
 In a 
number of communities around the country, private providers have been una-
ble or unwilling to supply high-speed internet. In response, some local gov-
ernments have created their own network providers—not quite agencies in the 
traditional regulatory sense, to be sure, but public (or public/private) entities 
controlled by the local government. In response, private providers have been 
lobbying states to preempt or remove local authority to invest in this kind of 
infrastructure.
306
 While not a perfect narrative of resistance to capture, this 
conﬂict does underscore the ability of local governments to resist the inﬂuence 
of entities that would otherwise have prevented local innovation. 
 
303. See David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 31 (2013) 
(“Regulatory capture is an idea at the center of virtually any discussion of the appropriate 
balance between Congress and administrative agencies.”). 
304. Cf. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LO-
CAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001) (arguing 
that investment in homes drives local politics). 
305. Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 795 (2012). 
306. Id. at 813 (listing the nineteen states where local governments face restrictions in providing 
local broadband services). 
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This is just one example of how a standard, long-standing debate in the 
discourse on administrative law refracts differently when situated in an institu-
tional context far removed from the standard federal paradigm. Many other 
core debates—about judicial review, the balance of powers, procedural legisla-
tion and executive oversight, among others—will similarly yield new insights 
from institutional variety. 
2. Unifying Administrative Law “All the Way Down” 
Although this Article has emphasized contrasts with the federal administra-
tive paradigm in order to highlight what is distinctly local, there is also clearly a 
fair amount of conceptual (and doctrinal) continuity across vertical levels of 
administration on certain irreducible features of the nature of the judicial-
agency relationship. Certain principles of rationality and justiﬁcation as well as 
procedural norms of notice and the opportunity to participate are inherent in 
the legal nature of administration. The ﬁne-grained details may look different 
at the federal, state, and local level, but these principles remain deﬁning fea-
tures of agency action. Which neighbors get notice of a hearing for a special ex-
ception before a board of zoning appeal may be very different than the audi-
ence for a notice of proposed rulemaking by the EPA to set national air quality 
standards. But the idea that a party impacted by an agency action ought to have 
the chance to weigh in on that action in some form emerges from the same 
kernel. 
There is value in drawing on the variety of structures in localities to think 
anew about how a variety of institutions—agencies, legislatures, and courts—
might do things differently at the federal and state levels, constitutional con-
straints permitting. Unifying administrative law all the way down to the local 
level can thus redound to the beneﬁt of legal scholarship on commonalities as 
well as variations in administrative contexts. As noted at the outset, scholars 
have done—and continue to do—valuable work that explores administrative 
law at the state level.
307
 That scholarship is instructive as a mid-point between 
the federal and the local, highlighting some features of state structure and prac-
tice that can fruitfully suggest avenues of inquiry at the much more complex 
sub-state level.
308
 That work has been done well, but has not had as much in-
ﬂuence as it should on the broader discourse of administrative law. Adding the 
layer of local administration will hopefully lead back up to the state level to fos-
ter a more vigorous dialogue for administrative law scholars who want to con-
 
307. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
308. Variations in electoral mechanisms for executive branch agents is one example. See supra 
Section III.B. 
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front long-standing jurisprudential and theoretical questions that have settled 
into too much of a stasis at the federal level. 
C. Toward an Agenda Moving Forward 
This Article’s exploration of local agencies only skims the surface of a sig-
niﬁcant and largely unexplored body of administrative practice and jurispru-
dence reviewing that practice. The Article sets a clear agenda for further work 
in local administrative law, but there are some particular questions of local 
agency context and practice that bear particular further examination. 
As a threshold matter, if administrative law addresses realms beyond judi-
cial review,
309
 it is well worth exploring in more detail whether individual, spe-
ciﬁc features of local-governmental structure have discernible consequences for 
agency authority, process, and policymaking that do not lead to litigation.
310
 
Empirically, for example, do local governments with limited or no separation of 
powers generate different agency practices, regardless of the reviewing court, 
than local governments with strong mayors? Does the extent of privatization in 
any local government have an impact on those administrative structures that 
remain public? Do local legislatures behave differently in delegating authority 
to local agencies that are more or less engaged with the community? As noted 
above, there is an emerging scholarship on distinctly “local” courts within state 
court systems.
311
 Do such courts identiﬁably vary in their approach to review-
ing “their” local agencies? There are many questions about the intersection be-
tween particular aspects of local-governmental structure, the work of local 
agencies, and patterns in the jurisprudence that this Article’s framework can 
help bring to the surface, and these questions bear further examination.
312
 
Another vein of future research will be detailing the jurisprudence of par-
ticular administrative regimes by speciﬁc jurisdiction or by substantive area. An 
assumption of this Article has been that, as with federal administrative law, a 
 
309. See supra notes 212-213 and accompanying text. 
310. After all, debates about questions such as the nature of executive oversight of agencies and 
other individual strands of the structure of administration at the federal level seem as lively 
as ever. Compare Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise 
with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2045-46 (2015) (discussing the procedural 
instabilities created by OIRA’s “unrestricted and nontransparent opportunities for political 
oversight and editing of agency technical analyses”), with Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of In-
formation and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840 (2013) 
(detailing the beneﬁts of OIRA review of agency decision making). 
311. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
312. There are a variety of speciﬁc administrative doctrines that could be explored at the local 
level as well. For example, should we understand the ﬁnality of agency action that allows ju-
dicial review differently at the local level than we do at the federal level? 
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localist administrative jurisprudence should begin on a transsubstantive basis. 
Additionally, the Article has assumed that an appropriate starting point is also 
transjurisdictional— factors that might be theoretically relevant to understand-
ing local administrative praxis are not unique to California, or Missouri, or 
Maine (let alone to larger or smaller local governments, as a conceptual mat-
ter).
313
 
Those assumptions, however, are only starting points. One question, then, 
is whether particular domains of local agency action validly yield meaningful 
procedural differences that are substantively grounded. Do the dictates, for ex-
ample, of educational equity demand certain norms of participation that may 
not be as salient in the arena of, say, land-use regulation? Does the greater de-
gree of federal funding in certain areas of social welfare policy change the terms 
of procedural fairness that prevail in those areas compared to relatively locally 
funded services, such as infrastructure? Does the scale of certain regulatory 
arenas, such as the regionalism evident in clean air policy, militate in favor of 
certain administrative structures and procedures? Similarly, state-level varia-
tion surely matters in practice, and individual states and localities are worthy of 
in-depth examination across administrative contexts. These, and any number 
of similar questions, are best answered from a baseline that recognizes certain 
overarching features of local administrative law, so as to understand whether 
and why particular idiosyncratic administrative norms make sense. 
Finally, this Article’s working hypothesis about what is signiﬁcant about lo-
cal administrative law can serve as an invitation for engagement with those 
strands of positive political theory and economics that examine the conse-
quences of speciﬁc institutional structures.
314
 Some of the work of translation 
to those discourses is inherent in this Article’s proposed jurisprudential frame-
work, of course, but scholars of local government in cognate ﬁelds can build on 
its structural-doctrinal insights to inform work on government form, political 
process, local democracy, and legitimacy. 
 
conclusion 
If, as T.S. Eliot wrote, “the end of all our exploring / [w]ill be to arrive 
where we started / [a]nd know the place for the ﬁrst time,”
315
 we can now see 
local governance through a new lens. The jurisprudence of the administrative 
 
313. On the question of the scale of local governance (as opposed to speciﬁc state-level variation), 
see supra Sections III.A and IV.A. 
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san competition in local legislative elections). 
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city-state rightly shares many foundational concerns with its more familiar 
counterpart in federal (and state) administrative law, most notably a deep focus 
on bureaucratic legitimacy, primarily through procedural protections and the 
calibration of the appropriate standard of judicial review. But courts and schol-
ars must begin a more careful examination of what distinguishes administra-
tion as practiced by cities, suburbs, counties, towns, and other local govern-
ments. In that domain, we see a wide array of governmental structures, 
agencies that often operate with relatively little procedural formality, a blending 
of public and private, and agency expertise that can be grounded less in tech-
nical knowledge and more in local experience. These are by no means the only 
salient factors that might shape local administrative law, but they can frame a 
discourse that can be reﬁned as courts take a more self-conscious approach to 
the endeavor of reviewing local administration and scholars consider the 
broader implications of adding the local to the discourse of the administrative 
state. That evolving exercise will shed new light on administrative law while 
opening a fundamentally new window into the work of the level of government 
closest to our daily lives. 
